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61 INTRODUCTION
“Part of my realism is that the Unites States cannot achieve salvation alone. It tried this from  
1791 to 1945. It tried this in other ways from 1945 to 1990. I am predicting that it will try this  
again in still some other ways from 1990 to, say, 2025. But unless it realizes that there is no  
salvation that is not the salvation of all humankind, neither it nor the rest of the world will  
surmount the structural crisis of our world-system” (Immanuel Wallerstein 1995, 205).
The purpose of this thesis is to critically analyze changes in the United States (US) 
foreign policy. The current hegemonic status of the United States is rooted in many 
different aspects such as economic prosperity and global cultural immersion; however, 
this thesis will concentrate on the political power. The United States is the most 
powerful nation-state in the world today, but this status is continuously being debated 
around the world as we have entered the “era of 'groupism' - the construction of 
defensive blocks, each of which asserts an identity around which it builds solidarity, and 
struggles to survive alongside and against other such groups” (Wallerstein 1995, 6-7). 
On paper the US is a member of many such groups, and has been a prominent founder 
of them, such as the United Nations (UN). Still, there is some question in whether the 
country is wholeheartedly dedicated to these groups, or merely wishes to control them 
and use as needed. The era of 'groupism' has also raised the question of the validity of 
the individual nation-state as the key player in the current world order, and has raised 
high hopes for the United Nations to assume greater responsibility and rise to an era of 
global organization (Münkler 2007, 146-147).
1.1 On the power and identity of the Empire
Many scholars have attempted to predict the longevity of the Empire of the United 
States. There are those who believe that the US heyday has already passed, and the state 
is on its way to decline and misery: “The today of which I speak began in 1945 and 
came to an end in 1990. In this period, in precisely this period and no longer, the United 
States was the hegemonic power of our world-system” (Wallerstein 1995, 176, see also 
7Patrick 2010). There are others who believe that the US Empire has not nearly even 
reached its high point today, and that the superpower will remain untouchable for 
decades, even centuries more, without needing anyone's assistance and without being 
threatened by anyone else (Robert Kagan 2003). There are those who acknowledge that 
some threats to the hegemony already exist, namely economical, and never admittedly 
politically or humanitarianly valued (Joseph Nye 2002). Then there are still those, who 
have begun to understand and admit the power and influence of the softer values of the 
United Nations and other international organizations, such as the European Union (T.R. 
Reid 2004).
This thesis will attempt to find out how the United States foreign policy has changed 
over the years, as more and more talk concentrates on the diminishing importance of the 
nation state, and on the move towards more collaboration at the international level, in 
solving the contemporary global crises pressing our planet. As Wallerstein states; 
“during the present world transition, it is effective to work both at the local and at the 
world level, but it is now of limited use to work at the level of the national state” (1995, 
6-7). Many seem to believe that the United States is not moving towards this trend, still 
strongly believing in the power of a nation-state. Others suggest that the hegemonic 
status of the country is enough to exempt it from any kind of 'groupism' and allows the 
country to act unilaterally (Patrick 2010). I believe that everyone agrees there are some 
challenges in the world today that no single country can solve without cooperation of 
others. Even those academics who believe that the US hegemonic decline is inevitable 
at some point, do believe that, for unidentified reasons, the country will still continue to 
push forward in its current path (Wallerstein 1995).
An integral part of this thesis is the analysis of the United States' political identity, and 
possible changes in it, towards the feeling of togetherness with the global humankind. In 
addition to the material superiority and the feeling of American exceptionalism the 
country possesses today, my opinion is that a certain superior identity that shows 
through in all official rhetoric affects the country's foreign policy-making in a 
fundamental way. The argument is that only through changes in the political identity, in 
other words, a change in the attitude towards other human beings non-American, can 
8the country shift focus and show a move towards a change in the world order. This 
would not imply that with this kind of change the US would lose power and status per 
se, but it does require a change in the way the country currently leads world politics. 
Kishore Mahbubani argues that “no appeal to universal ideals or principles will 
convince the US body politic to support multilateralism. Only an appeal to national self-
interest will do so” (2003, 140). My argument is that the US has yet to realize those two 
are actually the same thing. One must help everyone in order to help oneself. 
My research in the field of identity politics relies on David Campbell's post-structural 
writings on the topic, and on his way of seeing foreign policy as a political practice 
central to the constitution, production and maintenance of American political identity 
(1998). In his book Writing Security. US Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity, 
Campbell claims that the US security policy formation can be seen as a form of 
deconstructing national identity. According to Campbell, identity is always constructed 
through formulation of difference, and difference is constituted in relation to identity. 
The way in which Campbell describes the US identity as being formulated occurs 
through the differentiation of 'us' from the 'others', and the way to separate the others 
from us is via continuous articulation of discourses of danger. (1998, 9.)
The thinking of Chantal Mouffe on political identity can also be applied to the politics 
of the US. She claims that the acceptance of antagonism as an inherent part of a society 
determines the very ontological condition of a community. The notion that every 
identity is conditional and relies on the affirmation of difference sets the stage for a 
friend/enemy construction and collective identity formation. (2005, 2-3.) Mouffe, and 
Campbell, both argue that since the end of the Cold War the US has been struggling 
with the creation of a new political frontier to replace the old democratic/communist 
antagonism and debate (2005, 3-4). The open space left by the Cold War can be 
dangerous for a democratic system, as it may create an opportunity for the radical right 
to gain leverage in the political field with anti-democratic means, as it has been easier 
for them to found a new enemy to fight against, as has been for the moderates or the 
leftists (2005, 4-6). In the United States this has materialized in the emergence of the 
neo-conservative movement.
91.2 On the limits of the Constitutional democracy 
Because the United States is claimed to be the most powerful nation-state today, this 
thesis will also dwell into the domestic democratic system of the country. Some argue 
that the Constitutional democratic system in the US itself is ill-suited for successful and 
stable foreign policy formulation. The US has a presidential democratic system, which 
allocates a considerable amount of power to the executive branch of the government. 
However, to balance that power the Constitution created a structure of separation of 
powers, which keeps the power of the President in check. This feature, which is missing 
in parliamentary democracies, makes Congress a coequal with the executive branch in 
foreign policy-making, and thus constrains the decision-making process, creates tension 
within the government, and may complicate US involvement in international institutions 
(Patrick 2010). 
Another constraint in the US foreign policy-making stem from Münkler's (2007) 
statement that empires, as a general rule, require authoritarian leadership, and thus 
democratization would mean the collapse of the empire. This implies that the US would 
have to choose between its imperial politics or face the decline of its democratic 
practices. One reason for the democratic system not being well-fitted with empires is the 
fact that in a democratic system the leadership changes too often. Empires are viewed as 
long-lasting giants, but with the current democratic trends only “empires in a hurry” are 
able to form, and more often than not action taken in a hurry will lead to negative 
results. (Münkler 2007, 155.) In the US there are federal-level elections every two 
years, and campaigning is virtually continuous for all elected officials, as politics are 
practiced with keeping an eye on re-election (Aaltola and Salonius-Pasternak 2012). 
As we have entered the era of 'groupism', much talk has been centered around the 
question of how to transfer domestic democracy to a global level, and on the status of 
domestic democracies as well. In an article called "Democracy-Enhancing 
Multilateralism" a prominent US academic Robert Keohane et al. (2009) discuss in 
general the currently existing multilateral institutions (MI), and more particularly, their 
democratic or undemocratic nature, and how they affect domestic democracies of 
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existing nation-states. The authors believe that the current debate on the issue idealizes 
the current state of domestic democracy, and takes too ambitious a goal for the MI's to 
reach (2009, 4). Domestic democratic institutions are often idealized and held to high 
respect, even though the reality may be far from democratic. The fact that we live in a 
liberal democracy has put us at a specific ease, without the need to periodically go back 
and check what the situation is in practice (ibid., 5). 
Keohane et al. move on to formulate a concept called constitutional democracy, which 
can be used to describe the existing contemporary democracies, especially in the US 
(2009, 5-9). This concept includes many of the institutional constraints that check and 
balance power in today's democracies, all of which are said to contribute to enhancing 
democracy in today's nation-states. Keohane et al. defend some of the "depoliticized" 
institutions in place, claiming that letting them do their work in an insulated, non-
democratic vacuum, actually comes back to strengthen the democracy at the end, 
because of the valuable knowledge they provide to the people (Ibid., 8). This kind of 
privatization has been the practice of the neo-conservative elite in the US. 
If Keohane et al. have slim views of domestic democracies, they do so also of 
international institutions. The article rather bluntly states that MI's are not intended to be 
viewed so much as binding decision makers, but rather as transnational information 
networks, involving national officers and quasi-public bodies (Ibid., 19). Moreover, 
MI's should be thought of, by national governments, as crisis centers where one can turn 
to at the moment of national security crisis, to ask for judiciary advice, or to search the 
institutions' wide array of published "best practices", and choose accordingly to fit the 
national situation (Ibid., 20). It is clear that Keohane et al. consider MI's as something 
that exist separated from the citizens of nation-states, in a distance, unchangeable, and 
out of reach. 
This is a radically different way of seeing the world and tackling global problems as is 
practiced by the United Nations and other international groupings, which rely on the 
concept of universal human rights and equality of all people regardless of nationality 
and other personal traits. Campbell's emphasis on security and identity politics can be 
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contrasted with a social constructivist Alexander Wendt's vision in “Why a World State 
is Inevitable” (2003) as seeing this as the great paradox and dilemma standing in the 
way of the current nation-states' ability to evolve into a global democratic community 
where the entire concept of a security threat has been removed. The UN, being an 
intergovernmental organization without an independent governing body, is thus freed 
from the task of articulating its own identity under a single democratic logic, and is able 
to concentrate on pressing global issues. 
What Chantal Mouffe offers as a solution to this democratic deficiency Keohane et al. 
are claiming exists, is called antagonistic pluralism, which would manifest itself as a 
hegemony of democratic values achieved by a multiplication of democratic practices, 
institutionalized into a democratic matrix through which a multiplicity of subject 
identities could be formed (2005, 18). One instance of this would be to strengthen the 
existing multilateral institutions such as the United Nations. 
Carol Gould (2009) points out that multilateral institutions implement global 
democracy, not domestic democracy, and thus the two are not intended to be exactly 
alike. Gould reminds us that global democracy should not be seen as one huge, 
collective body where all citizens on earth have an obligation to participate, but suggests 
that all those who would choose to participate in the decision making, should be able to 
do that, especially on issues where one is affected by the outcome. Instead of 
concentrating on a single world state type of a body, Gould would like to see more 
progress towards the creation of multiple transnational communities concentrating on 
different issues and deliberating in global forums. (2009, 2.) In these smaller scale 
global forums it would still be possible to include direct participation by citizens, which 
is now widely criticized to be lacking from global democracy (ibid., 15). 
According to Michael Zürn, Keohane et al. seem to believe that global participation is 
quite impossible to achieve, if even desirable, and should remain at the decision-making 
level of “executive multilateralism” and political level of “embedded liberalism”, where 
international organizations are considered to maintain some delegated authority, but are 
not integrated into the domestic political order that requires legitimacy (2010, 98). In a 
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contrast to this, Daniele Archibugi points out that rooting for global democracy does not 
necessarily include the desire to impoverish the function of the state (2010). However, 
in the creation of global democratic institutions, one should think of ways for them to 
represent global citizens instead of national governments (Gould 2009). 
1.3 On the future of the US – UN relationship 
Research in this field is vital today. As the relationship between the United States and 
many international organizations has been troublesome for some time, this thesis will 
take a critical look at the US foreign policy towards the United Nations. The UN will 
serve as a reference point when analyzing whether or not the US shows willingness to 
participate in the era of 'groupism' and formation of global democratic structures. At the 
same time as the US has been facing criticism for its foreign policy decisions, questions 
have been raised on the overall usefulness of the UN as a viable actor in the 
international arena. According to Yves Beigbeder, criticism has been raised regarding 
“...the poor performance of the UN in the maintenance of peace and security, in 
promoting development, in eradicating poverty and in protecting human rights,” among 
other things (Beigbeder 1997, 7). 
The aim here is to determine whether the US is on track to repair its relationship with 
the UN, and simultaneously help reinstate the positive image of the UN to the world, or 
will it, instead, use this opportunity of the UN's bad reputation and turn its back 
completely on the organization and continue on the hegemonic road1. Mahbubani states 
that it would serve the national interests of the US to strengthen, rather than weaken, the 
UN institutions (2003, 140). Still, the US has appeared uncommitted in the recent past. 
In this light one might wonder how much the US foreign policy decisions affect the 
overall performance of the UN. It could be argued that for quite some time the US has 
1 In an unprecedented address to the UN Security Council in 2000, the Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations, Jesse Helms, stated that if the UN did not respect the sovereignty of the American people, 
and if it attempts to impose authority over the US, the country will withdraw from the organization. 
Barbara Crossette, ”Helms, in Visit to UN, Offers Harsh Message,” New York Times, January 21, 
2000.
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been refusing to play by the rules of the UN (Ryan 2006, 174-175). The recent attitude 
of the US has shown that whenever the UN has failed to follow the country's lead, it has 
turned towards other international organizations for support, or alternatively, created 
brand new coalitions that are ready to act when needed. A US representative Kim 
Holmes claims that the Security Council has too often been “...unable to end conflicts, 
halt threats of aggression, or prevent proliferation. The right of self-defense thus plays 
an essential role in maintaining international peace and security” (2004). 
Despite the above, the United States is still one of the United Nation's most prominent 
members, and has historically been one of its most deliberate financial supporters. 
Holmes argues that the US is still the UN's largest contributor and this implies that the 
UN is not insignificant to US foreign policy (2004). However, the United States, since 
the mid-1980's and until very recently, has remained also the greatest debtor to the UN, 
owing hundreds of millions to the UN regular budget, and more towards peacekeeping 
(Beigbeder 1997, 91, Mahbubani 2003). During this time, the European Union as a 
whole has surpassed the US as the largest contributor to the UN budget2. 
An interesting question is how strongly this relationship, with its problems, will affect 
the whole institution, which includes almost two hundred member states. Can the 
attitude of one country have a permanent effect on the whole institution? Will the US be 
able to freeze the entire organization on its demand, or is the UN community on the 
verge of reaching its limit of tolerance with this one member among the others, and 
could the US possibly face consequences for its actions? It is peculiar that even though 
it is clear that the US has acted illegally within the UN framework, the organization has 
taken no steps so far to punish the country for its actions (Ryan 2006, 183). My 
argument rests on the basis that the policies of the US, and those of the UN, are based 
on completely different grounds, and that is the reason why the two have so much 
trouble looking into a common future. 
2 “Since 1972, the U.S. is assessed at the ceiling rate of 25 per cent. For 1995, the European Union 
countries pay 34.39 per cent of the UN regular budget” (Beigbeder 1997, 95).
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2 RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The research questions in this thesis are the following:
1. Identifying instances of change in the foreign policy rhetoric and actual policy-
making in two US presidential administrations.
I have chosen to study the second term of President George W. Bush (from 2005 to 
2008) and the first term of President Barack Obama (from 2009 to 2012). The reason for 
choosing to study this topic from the presidential point of view stem from the global and 
very general iconization of the American president as the most powerful man in the 
world (Singh 2006, 28). Thus the hypothesis is that he must have an important say in the 
way his country shapes the global world order. Also, the foreign policy-making in the 
US has been described as having become more and more domesticated during the last 
decades, meaning that domestic issues rather than international political conditions have 
been the defining features in foreign policy formulation (Maidment and McGrew 1991, 
141). Hence my thesis will look at domestic documents when interpreting the US 
foreign policy-making, instead of concentrating on international issues in which the US 
participates. 
Choosing these two presidential terms stem from the fact that these two presidents 
represent the two prevailing and opposing political parties in the country, the 
Republican and the Democratic parties, and they come from very different personal 
backgrounds as well. That is an important domestic fact that should have a strong 
impact on foreign policy. Internationally, these years provide an excellent background 
as the debate on state versus global democracy has heightened recently, and the 
relationship between the US and the UN has been questionable. The goal is to find out 
whether or not policy-making has changed dramatically, or at all, after president Obama 
took office in 2009.3
3 Note: Since the first term of President Obama is not yet over at this writing, but I want to keep the 
research current, the nature of this paper is to use President Bush's term as the basis for comparison, 
and more analysis may be afforded to his policies. Moreover, my research will not reach into the 
campaign of President Obama's running for his second term, even though it is already on its way at the 
time of writing.
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The beginning hypothesis is that some kind of change should have occurred with the 
presidential shift. The US practices presidential democracy by Constitution, which gives 
considerable amount of power to the president, and the cabinet he chooses for himself4. 
The presidential influence has been historically preeminent especially in the field of 
foreign policy-making (Maidment and McGrew 1991, 74, 83). Also, differences 
between the two parties, the Democrats and the Republicans, tend to be rather wide and 
openly debated, and the two opposing sides often promote very different foreign 
policies (Singh 2006, 16). The structure of separation of powers, according to Daniel 
Wirls, can sometimes serve as an invitation for the president to “go it alone, especially 
in the realm of foreign and national security policy. Congress will often cheer the 
president on in such unilateral endeavors.” (2010, 12.) This implies that rather drastic 
changes can always be expected when the presidency changes in the country.
In terms of personality traits, President Bush can be described to be a conservative, 
religious, and nationalistic leader who represents the rural areas of the country. 
President Obama, on the other hand, may be called a liberal, tolerant, with experience in 
the urban and international arenas. These descriptions can serve as a background when 
considering the signifying chain of the discourses. By the time the Bush presidency was 
drawing towards an end, he was not a very popular figure internationally5, and I 
remember the world expecting impatiently for a change in leadership in that country 
(Buckley and Singh 2006, 14). The election of President Obama was historical in many 
aspects, not least because of him being the first-ever president of the country with 
African-American inheritance (Aaltola and Salonius-Pasternak 2012, 4), and the world 
sure expected a lot from him.
4 The Constitution of the United States, Article II.
5 The Pew Global Attitudes Project polling data indicates that the public confidence in the US President 
in countries such as Germany, France, Japan, Russia, and China was at the lowest level in 2008, 
measured since 2005. 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/indicator=6&country=181&response=Confidence 
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The second research question is the following:
2. Identifying change in the foreign policy of the US towards the UN, analyzed 
through an identity formation perspective.
Even if some actual changes in the foreign policy-making appear apparent after the first 
Obama term, it needs to be determined whether or not the new policies serve to fulfill 
the same goals as before even though the country is getting there by different means. I 
will look for signs towards the crucial change in the attitude of the government of the 
United States towards the United Nations and the way in which international 
organizations are perceived by the country. 
The hypothesis is that the underlying identity and idea behind the fundamental belief in 
the mission of the United States in the world has not changed a whole lot. At the 
beginning of my research project I tend to agree with Heikki Patomäki in The Political  
Economy of Global Security where he argues that the most likely future scenario will 
resemble closely the dynamics of the late 20th century politico-economic struggle and 
competition ending only in great destruction, instead of us standing on the verge of an 
unseen witnessing of a great leap of improvement in the human condition resulting in 
global peace and democracy (2008).
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3 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED STATES
”Realism was first developed systematically by twentieth-century thinkers such as Morgenthau  
and Waltz although it is often associated with a great tradition of political thinkers which  
includes Thucydides, Hobbes, and Machiavelli. Long the dominant perspective in International  
Relations, realism emphasizes the unending competition for power and security in the world of  
states. Sovereignty, anarchy, and the security dilemma are crucial terms in its lexicon; in the  
main the idea of global progress is absent from its vocabulary” (Scott Burchill 2005,103).
The nature of this thesis is to be a theoretical, qualitatively critical analysis of written 
materials. The view of the researcher is that theory is of an utmost importance in any 
attempt to explain international relations. The aim is to view the world ontologically and 
explain the world system as it is hierarchically organized today, and to attempt to predict 
how it may change in the future. As the main focus of the thesis is on the United States 
foreign policy, it will be explained most thoroughly. This chapter offers a brief historical 
outlook of the meta-theories behind the recent US administrations: liberalism6, realism, 
and neorealism. Throughout the thesis I will introduce thinkers critical of these 
International Relations meta-theories and who represent alternative approaches to 
understanding the world, such as radicalism, social constructivism, and post-
structuralism, because these theories have been more vocal about the changes they wish 
to see in the international system. 
Chapter 4 describes the United Nations' foundational theory of liberal internationalism. 
I will then explain briefly the internal structure of the UN and the role of the US in it. In 
chapters 5 and 6 I will dwell deeper into the United States' political culture, and 
specifically detail different approaches to security politics through theories of balance of 
power, collective security, sovereignty and unilateralism. The initial attitude towards 
these theories and the usage of them by the leaders indicates how the US sees itself 
situated in the current world order. 
6 The role of liberalism (and neoliberalism) in this thesis has been left at the minimal handling, as the 
researcher's view is that even though it is a relevant theory in the field of the United States' economic 
policies, and describes the international political economy of today, the theory of realism (and 
neorealism) better describes the US political spectrum for the purposes of this thesis. 
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3.1 From liberalism to realism
Before World War I (WW I) liberalism was the dominant international relations theory. 
WW I was supposed to be the war to end all wars, and international atmosphere was 
hopeful for peaceful coexistence. There existed an ideological way of thinking that the 
world would be a better place if only states wanted it to be. These hopes turned out to be 
false, however, and the period resulted in another, even more destructive war, World 
War II (WW II). In the aftermath of WW II nobody held any unrealistic utopias 
anymore, and the international arena was described as Hobbesian anarchy. The 
prevailing international theory since the mid-20th century, and the backbone behind the 
creation of the United Nations, has thus been realism. 
Classical realism is traced back to writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, 
Morgenthau, Weber, and Carr (Lebow 2010, 59.) The realists criticized the liberals by 
claiming that one needs to look at the world simply as it is, and not how one would like 
it to be. Realism understands that existing forces are much stronger than the interest to 
change. Realists are often pessimists about the capabilities of humans (or states) to 
change. The United States' power and security politics can be called Classical realist, 
with the rhetoric of Great Powers and the task of maintaining the world's strongest 
military. Classical realism also understands that a great power often turns out to be its 
own worst enemy, as power welcomes first success and then hubris, and blinds the 
actors to the need of self-restraint (Lebow 2010, 60). 
3.2 From Neorealism to Neo-conservatism
The basic claim in this thesis is that the United States government sees the world 
through a neorealist lens. Kenneth Waltz's neorealist theory can specifically be applied 
here, based on his 1979 book Theory of International Politics. Christian Reus-Smith 
describes Waltz as having advanced a radically revised theory, based on realism, which 
may also be called structural realism. Neorealism builds on two basic assumptions: the 
world order remaining anarchical, due to the lack of a central authority, and that 
resulting in states' primary goal of survival by maximization of power, and particularly 
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their military power (Burchill et al. 2005, 210-211). Classical realism and neorealism 
both share the fundamental view of states' need to accumulate power, but they differ in 
the reasons for that. Classical realism believes that the answer is human nature; a man's 
will to have power and dominate others. Structural realists, on the other hand, claim that 
the structure of the international system forces states to pursue power in order to 
survive. (Mearsheimer 2010, 78.)
In Neorealism and its Critics, Waltz describes the domestic political sphere as 
integrated, hierarchical, and organized, because the government provides protection to 
its citizens through the monopoly on the legitimate use of force. This is not the case in 
the international sphere where a central government is nonexistent, and that is the 
reason why interdependence and cooperation is possible only at a very loose level. 
According to Waltz, the structure of the current international system limits the 
cooperation of states because of the constant feeling of insecurity and mistrust, and the 
fear of becoming dependent on another state. Because the possibility of war is always 
present, self-sufficiency and widening of the scope of control have to be the state's main 
concerns. (Waltz 1986.) As stated in Social Theory of International Politics, Wendt's 
interpretation of the situation is that neorealists are able to stand behind a shield of their 
theory, and explain all of their foreign policy behavior as evidence of maintaining the 
balance of power in the anarchical system (1999).
Within the neorealist camp there is a division between those who believe that states 
should seek to maximize their power to the limit and aim for hegemony, also called 
offensive realists, and those who believe that “appropriate amount of power” is enough 
to maintain the balance of power in the international system (Waltz 1979, 40), often 
called defensive realists (Mearsheimer 2010, 81). Defensive realists claim that if one 
state becomes hegemonic, other great powers will automatically start balancing against 
it. The offensive realists stand closer to classical realists in believing that power is an 
end in itself, whereas defensive realists treat power as a means to ensure survival. (ibid. 
78.) Mearsheimer claims, moreover, that realism has made a resurrection after the 
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the US, and the current world order is still 
mainly concerned with military politics, power, and survival. Rise in nationalism, which 
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glorifies the state, ensures the position of the state as superior. (2010, 92.)
Neo-conservatism is the mainstream theory that has been identified with President 
George W. Bush's administration. It is no doubt certain that the political worldview of 
the sitting president, especially in the United States with a presidential democratic 
system, is an important factor in the foreign policy formation, as is stated by Haas: ”The 
content of a world-order ideology is a projection of a policy-maker’s implicit or explicit 
theory about the world” (1990, 65). That is why it is crucial to research how neo-
conservatism together with neorealism has comprised the platform for the US policy 
formation. One of the main aims of the thesis is to show that neo-conservatism has been 
replaced with something else since the Barack Obama administration took office in 
2009. 
Chantal Mouffe describes the neo-conservative movement in the US as having first been 
raised in the 1960's to guard against 'excess of democracy' (2005, 23). The movement 
aimed to restrict the power of the numerous social movements at the time and warned 
against the “danger that this explosion of egalitarian claims poses to the system of 
authority” (2005, 23). Lebow explains the rise of neo-conservatives in the US as having 
occurred after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, as the 
'unipolar moment' in history begun (2010, 72). 
What is interesting in regards to neo-conservatism, is that President Bush himself has 
not been called a neo-conservative, nor has he claimed to be one. Instead, this label has 
been attached to his close aides and advisers especially during his first term, from 2000 
to 2004. The names most often linked to the label include Paul Wolfowitz, Lewis Libby, 
Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld. Stephen Ryan describes their neo-
conservative strategy as involving a hardheaded realist worldview combined with a 
strong belief in the US exceptionalism. This includes a strong belief in the material 
powers as well as the moral superiority of the country. The neo-conservative foreign 
policy stance has also been described as the most hostile towards the UN in the past few 
decades. (Ryan 2006, 175.)
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4 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
”The USA is sometimes described as hegemonic, with the burdens, benefits, and  
temptations dominance implies. It does not always behave as a Kantian state. With  
military spending nearly as great as all the rest of the world, it is tempted to rely on the  
armed force that money and high technology create. But hegemony cannot last forever.  
A Kantian liberal perspective on world politics can provide means for sustaining a  
stable peace when military advantage fades” (Bruce Russett 2010, 112). 
4.1 From liberal internationalism to global democratic projections
During the latter part of the 20th century, and the beginning of the 21st century, some 
progress has been evidenced towards accomplishing a more peaceful world order. This 
is especially true among the liberal democratic states (that constitute the majority of the 
UN Security Council: France, UK, and USA) and in other countries around the world. 
Aside from maintaining peace, states today are much more interconnected through 
neoliberal international economic policies and practices. New regional economic, 
political, as well as military blocks have been formed, and thus the Western World as 
well as Russia and China have seen less conflict with each other during the past 
decades. This is not to say that conflicts and wars around the world have seized to exist, 
however. All these developments have inspired the United Nations, as well as other 
international actors, to abandon the more pessimistic realist worldview, and to adopt a 
more positive and fresh ideology, under the title of liberal internationalism.
Liberal internationalism is associated with such classical thinkers as John Locke and 
Immanuel Kant. This theory is also concerned with solving the security dilemma in the 
international arena. Kant envisioned a 'pacific federation' of nation states bound together 
by cosmopolitan laws and collective security alliances. The way to achieve this lasting 
peace is through the spread of democratic governments, international interaction and 
close cooperation in the economic field, as well as memberships in normative 
international organizations. The liberal view puts more weight than the realist view on 
the ability of the human being to progress and to achieve peace by rational self-interest 
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and cooperation with others. (Russett 2010, 96-104.)  
Even though the liberal internationalist view accepts the basic underlying structures of 
neorealism, the more idealist view is that cooperation is still possible in an anarchic 
world and even without a hegemon. Predictability of state action, and thus a more stable 
world, can be achieved through regimes and institutional cooperation with shared habits 
and interests, including monitoring of compliance and possible sanctions (Burchill 
2005, 65). The main difference between neorealism and the liberal intergovernmental 
view lies in the neorealist separation of the domestic and international spheres. 
According to Andrew Linklater ”the existence of a more or less unbridgeable gulf 
between domestic and international politics is a central theme in realist and especially 
neorealist thought” (2005, 103). Linklater continues to interpret Waltz as follows: 
According to this approach, states cannot escape the politics of 'self-help' which 
separates the international political system from national politics” (2005, 109).
Scott Burchill describes neorealists to claim that ”the moral aspirations of states are 
thwarted by the absence of an overarching authority which regulates their behavior 
towards each other. The anarchical nature of the international system tends to 
homogenize foreign policy behavior by socializing states into the system of power 
politics. The requirements of strategic power and security are paramount in an insecure 
world, and they soon override the ethical pursuits of states, regardless of their domestic 
political complexions” (2005, 57). This implies that no amount of democratic nations 
and no theory of democratic peace will convince the neorealists as long as there is no 
legal authority on global level. The above statement also fits with the neo-conservative 
policies of the US where the status awarded to security overrides all other aspects of 
politics and explains and justifies even non-democratic practices by the leaders. 
The European Union is a valid example of a grouping that has completely abandoned 
the neorealist theory. The EU has been moving further and further away from this type 
of self-help policy as the line between national and international politics hardly exists 
anymore, and the states of the union are increasingly willing to resign their sovereignty 
for the common good (Russett 2010, 109-111). The UN, on the other hand, never really 
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had that decision to make in the first place, since its aspirations have always concerned 
the common, international good.
The world has matured from a post-WWII multipolar intergovernmental system into a 
unipolar hegemonic global order, and now awaits for a new structural framework to be 
put in place. As many have acknowledged, the largest stakeholder, as well as the main 
motor and the only unit that would be able to provide the right leadership towards 
achieving a single global community, is the United States (Mahbubani 2003, 152). 
Murphy agrees with the task ahead stating that in the creation of a new world order the 
US should assume the role of a leader but not a dominant one (2004, 359). Even Waltz 
accepts that hegemonies do not last forever, and he does not even promote a unipolar 
world as the source of lasting peaceful order. Waltz, however, does not see a way in 
which a hegemon could transform itself into a responsible leader from a dominant 
power (Burchill 2005, 61). I see the United Nations as having the capability of 
providing the needed structural framework for global democratic practices, member 
states willing to promote it. 
4.2 The Role of the United States in the United Nations' Structure 
“The United Nations does extraordinary good around the world -- feeding the hungry, caring  
for the sick, mending places that have been broken. But it also struggles to enforce its will, and  
to live up to the ideals of its founding. I believe that those imperfections are not a reason to  
walk away from this institution -- they are a calling to redouble our efforts. The United Nations  
can either be a place where we bicker about outdated grievances, or forge common ground; a  
place where we focus on what drives us apart, or what brings us together; a place where we  
indulge tyranny, or a source of moral authority. In short, the United Nations can be an  
institution that is disconnected from what matters in the lives of our citizens, or it can be an  
indispensable factor in advancing the interests of the people we serve.” (President Barack  
Obama, September 23, 20097)
7 Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly United Nations Headquarters New 
York, New York on September 23, 2009 accessed via 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-
General-Assembly .
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As the relationship between the US and the UN is multifaceted and complex (Buckley 
and Singh 2006), the UN system covering a wide range of interest areas, it is necessary 
to limit the research in this paper to certain issue areas within that relationship. In my 
thesis I will be concentrating on areas of power and security, and touching upon the 
issue of rule of law. The body of the UN most effectively involved with these issues is 
the Security Council as the only unit capable of producing binding obligations for the 
member states. 
Ambassador Joseph M Torsella (2012) describes the UN as follows: ”What began as a 
diplomatic meeting-place for 53 countries, with a small budget for typists and 
interpreters, is now a vast and diverse public organization, with 193 members most of 
whom were not even states in 1945. The UN system is involved in everything from 
feeding malnourished children to ensuring sustainable political transitions to preserving 
world heritage sites. According to UN figures, the entire UN system is now a $36 billion 
enterprise, larger than the individual GDPs of half its member states.” 
As the UN has matured over the decades, so the world has changed and requires 
constant reform from the participants in the global system. As the Secretary-General of 
the UN stated in the Millennium Report: “While the post-war multilateral system made 
it possible for the new globalization to emerge and flourish, globalization, in turn, has 
progressively rendered its designs antiquated. Simply put, our post-war institutions were 
built for an international world, but we now live in a global world. Responding 
effectively to this shift is the core institutional challenge for world leaders today”8. 
The UN body viewed most unfavorably by the US is the General Assembly. The 
Assembly represents the masses, the peoples of the world, and in it every country is 
equal with only one vote. The Assembly delivers resolutions after vocal debates, and it 
has a history of raising critizism in its publications. These resolutions can irritate 
member states (such as the US). However, they are not able to hurt individual 
governments as the decisions are not legally binding. (Mahbubani 2003, 141.) In 
8 Report of the Secretary-General on the Millennium Assembly entitled ”We the Peoples: The Role of 
the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century,” March 27, 2000 accessed via 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm .
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contrast to this, the UN Secretariat as well as the Security Council have historically 
been symphatetic and respectful of the US. The Security Council represents the 
aristocracy of the UN, and it does not come as a surprise that the five countries with the 
veto-power have not been keen to take part in the UN reform. Only one time has a 
Secretary-General of the UN been recalled to take a stance opposite the US (Boutros-
Ghali), and his term was not renewed due to a US veto (ibid. 142). 
The great paradox in the relationship between the US and the UN lies in the fact that 
whenever the UN demonstrates independence from the US, and its policy does not 
necessarily coalesce with the US short-term interests, the US protests, even though the 
UN decision would ultimately advance the US long-term interests (Mahbubani 2003, 
149). Mahbubani describes the current US policy towards the UN as putting pressure on 
the organization from two different ends, and thus not receiving any desired results. 
This means that as the US attempts to shape the UN system to comply with its own 
interests, and at the same time trying to form the organization to manage larger global 
interests, the system may eventually fall apart without achieving anything (ibid. 149). 
This again shows the non-committed nature of the US to the inherent values of the UN. 
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5 SELECTIVE APPROACHES TO SECURITY 
5.1 Balance of power theory
According to Kenneth Waltz (1979), the only distinct theory about international politics 
to date is the balance of power theory. Balances of power prevail, when the international 
order remains anarchic, and its units (states) wish to survive. The theory makes 
assumptions about the interests and motives of states, and it explains the constraints that 
confine all states in the system. Waltz says it is expected that states tend to emulate the 
successful policies of others, and thus balances recurrently keep forming. This is still 
the reality of the international order, as states continuously compete against each other, 
in the absence of a central world government. Balances keep forming and the order may 
change from unipolar to bi-polar and even to a multipolar balance. Balance of power 
theory is supported by the realist camp in world politics, and the US can be said to be 
supportive of this system. 
In this reality, the United Nations, and namely its Security Council (SC), was founded in 
1945 on the principle theory of balance of power9. This was the only way to make 
international cooperation possible after the devastating two World Wars. The balance is 
based on the veto-power of the five permanent members of the council (France, The 
United Kingdom, The United States, China, and Soviet Union10). Robert Cox argued 
already in his 1987 book that it was more than clear at that point already, which two 
countries were the determining ones (the US and the Soviet Union), and which three 
were chosen as members in acknowledgment of their historic status in world affairs 
(Britain, France, and China).This framework still exists in the Security Council despite 
numerous changes in the international arena, including disappearance and formation of 
countries, such as Russia, and creation of strong political regional blocks such as the 
European Union, and the rise in global attention and importance of the continents of 
Africa and South America, for example. Although many years have been spent debating 
and negotiating the much needed Security Council reform, nothing concrete has yet 
been achieved. 
9 Charter of the United Nations, Article V.
10 The Soviet Union has since ceased to exist and the country in the SC is now called Russia.
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5.2 Collective security
Closely tied to the theory of liberal internationalism is the concept of collective security, 
that preferably replaces the balance of power concept altogether. Scott Burchill claims 
that; ”balance of power was the product of elite collusion which resulted in international 
relations being arranged to suit the interests of those who ruled Great Powers” (2005, 
45). This change in the ideology has also sparked an interest to reform the Security 
Council from the 1945 setup. The former opposing camps in the SC after the world wars 
today agree increasingly with each other, as the tasks of the UN have evolved 
throughout the years. They no longer need to fight and balance each other, but instead 
work together to advance the peace for all humankind. Heikki Patomäki describes 
collective security as follows:
”Alker, Biersteker, and Inoguchi (1989) treat collective security simply as a power-
balancing alternative. They argue, quite provocatively, that 'Wilsonian collective 
security was not diametrically opposed to power-balancing, but rather redefined and 
globalized an older Eurocentric power-balancing system' (Alker et al. 1989:145). The 
only difference was/is that any threat to peace was/is assumed to be of basic concern to 
all members of the international society. Consequently, aggression was/is outlawed by a 
'balance' of 'all against one' (2002, 62-63)”.
This sums up perfectly the current security-theory behind the UN. Whether or not this 
has been realized in practice is another question. If all agree to act as all for one, what 
happens when someone decides not to play by the rules whenever they do not benefit 
from them? The world has seen many of these situations recently in the disputes 
between the United States and the United Nations, when the US has acted unilaterally 
according to its own interests. In addition to giving concrete examples of disputes, Ryan 
argues that the United States has never been fully committed to the Charter principles of 
collective security and peaceful settlements of disputes, if they happen to conflict with 
the vital national interests of the US. In sum, no president of the US has ever given the 
UN much influence in foreign policy-making. (Ryan 2006, 176.)
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The European Union (EU), on the other hand, has for decades now been engaged in the 
process of creating a liberal intergovernmental community of collective security that has 
deliberately chosen to end conflicts within its ever-growing borders, as well as to 
promote peace outside its borders. Liberal institutionalism, of which the EU is also an 
example, believes that cooperation within states is possible even in an anarchic world, 
and even without a hegemon (Russett 2010). Anarchy can be conquered by regimes that 
constrain state behavior, and EU and the UN are examples of these types of regimes. 
According to John F. Murphy, the European Union countries have created themselves a 
new legal order, that is more than a new branch of international law, and borders on 
being a state in itself, and which enjoys supremacy over the national law of all member 
states (Murphy 2004, 354). The US has shown no willingness to cooperate regionally in 
security matters aside from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which it 
clearly dominates. 
Alexander Wendt is one to believe that before it is possible for humans to concentrate 
on saving this planet, the states need to be able to believe that war is completely off the 
agenda. This is why Wendt believes that the current international system will eventually 
move, in five stages, to a world state with common security and collective identity, 
where the security dilemma does not exist. According to Wendt, in the current situation, 
it is expected that a ”hyper-power” such as the US is acting unilaterally with ”go it 
alone power”, as well as for small and middle sized powers to federate and combine 
their strength against the hegemony, like the EU has been performing. Wendt's 
conclusion is that even though a hegemon can afford to stall development towards a 
more peaceful world order, there is nothing it can do in the end but join the others in the 
pursuit, or face complete destruction (Wendt 2003). Which path will the US take?
5.3 Sovereignty
Closely related to the security subject matter is the changing value given to the term 
sovereignty, in theory as well as in practice. Carl Christol defines the historical 
Westphalian concept of sovereignty as follows: ”In the 17th century, at a time of 
international anarchy, the concept of national sovereignty offered protection to the legal 
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right of a State to continue its existence without foreign interference” (2004, 14). The 
world has, however, moved on from the times of national head of states' unlimited right 
to protection above all law. Christol believes that national leaders today are obliged to 
take into account the relationship between their own state and the UN, as well as the 
ever-growing number of other intergovernmental organizations in which states perform 
foreign policy, and which restrict the unilateral exponents of policy-making (2004, 11). 
A country's attitude towards sovereignty is closely tied to the national values and 
identity of the state, and constitutes a major factor in foreign policy formation.
David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong posit the defense of the United States 
sovereignty as the defining principle in the US foreign policy (2003, 19). This is a clear 
case of realism. In a contrast to this, the EU countries, for example, have deliberately 
chosen, according to liberal theory, to reduce their national sovereignty in the hands of 
the increasing supra-national nature of their politics, whereas in the United States the 
value placed on sovereignty seems to increase as is the nature in a neorealist system. 
Mahbubani argues that most people in the world, except those residing in the US, 
understand and actually feel the impact of globalization and the loss of autonomy each 
day (2003, 139). The protection of sovereignty in the US includes the consideration of 
domestic norms, laws, and standards as prior and superior to any international ones 
(Malone and Khong 2003, 19). 
Malone and Khong argue that other states promote multilateralism not only because it 
helps them advance their own global position, but also because they truly see 
multilateralism as an important liberal goal in itself (2003, 21). This again has to do 
with the question of identity and attitude towards others in the world, and implies that 
the US sees itself above others instead of as equals. Murphy also states that the reasons 
behind the US protection of sovereignty lies in the inherent attitude of “triumphalism, 
exceptionalism, and provincialism”, and reflects a fundamental distrust towards 
centralized powers, which is mirrored in the US Constitution (2004, 354). 
It has been previously stated that one of the main features of a neorealistic worldview is 
to draw a distinct line between the domestic and the international spheres. The 
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hypothesis is that the US tends to rely mainly on national law and sovereignty, and it 
uses international law only in cases where it can be of positive influence to the country. 
This includes completely disregarding international law any time it may not be of 
assistance to the foreign policy goals of the government. 
This can be contrasted by the sole usage of international law by the United Nations. The 
largest difference can be found in the underlying attitude behind the formation of 
international law within the international system and within the United States. The 
reason for creating international law for the UN lies in the fact that it works as a tool for 
countries to tackle problems they could not resolve alone. It also serves as a protection 
to all member states, from each other as well as from outside threats. By being 
members, states recognize and respect the laws of the system and in all of their behavior 
make sure that they abide by them. This is how, ideally, member states see the UN. The 
US, on the other hand, maintains the attitude that international law may be used if it 
adds something positive to its national law, but when it does not, it will be sharply 
ignored. This is possible, of course, because there is no binding legal authority at the 
international level. 
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6 THE UNITED STATES AND UNILATERALISM
”Today military intervention is progressively less a product of decisions that arise out of the old  
international order or even U.N. Structures. More often it is dictated unilaterally by the United  
States, which charges itself with the primary task and then subsequently asks its allies to set in  
motion a process of armed containment and/or repression of the current enemy of Empire.  
These enemies are most often called terrorist, a crude conceptual and terminological reduction  
that is rooted in a police mentality” (Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri 2001, 37).
Since the term unilateralism has been increasingly used to characterize the United States 
foreign policy-making in recent years, it is essential to cover that concept in detail in 
this research. The latest move in the US towards unilateralism began during the Clinton 
administration, but accelerated under the Bush presidency. Lebow describes the neo-
conservatives as having mistaken power for influence, and felt that the hegemony was 
not bound by any norms, treaties, or agreements that would constrain the pursuit of the 
interests of the country (2010, 72). 
The term unilateralism can be used to describe a policy by a country that opts out of a 
multilateral framework, or acts alone when facing and addressing a global or regional 
challenge, instead of choosing to participate in collective action (Malone and Khong 
2003, 3). In contrast, the term multilateralism may refer to multiple situations from a 
coalition of three or more individual states working together to broad formal 
multilateral organizations (ibid. 2). For the purpose of this thesis, the concentration will 
be on analyzing the US participation in multilateral institutions such as the UN. 
Specifically, the attempt is to analyze the degree to which the US respects and follows 
international rules and laws, or chooses to ignore them when facing challenges to 
national security. 
Carl Christol, in International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy, defines unilateralism as 
follows: ”Unilateralism, with its emphasis on national sovereignty, holds that States are 
free to choose their foreign policies. This outlook is favored by States well-positioned 
because of their economic, military, scientific, and technological attributes” (2004, 16). 
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The United States is the most powerful country in the world today, so is it authorized to 
act unilaterally? Even though it is not clear where this authorization stems from, the US 
has been acting increasingly unilaterally in recent years (Ryan 2007). Christol describes 
the US attitude towards the UN and other international organizations as them having the 
burden of proving to the US that it would be beneficial to the interests of the country to 
participate in and follow common policies, whereas multilateralistically oriented parties 
to these organizations believe that the signing on to common Charters and agreements 
clearly demonstrate their relevance and should not be questioned afterward (2004, 17).
The recent neorealist/neo-conservative practice of the US foreign policy may, and has 
already, caused conflicts between the US and the UN, which is a major supporter of 
multilateralism between states. Patomäki among others views this as a major concern of 
our time: ”Will the second phase of hegemony of the USA, accompanied by its 
increasing unilateralism and arrogance, lead to the erosion of the major co-operative 
institutions of the post-Second World War world?” (2002, 132) This is a question this 
thesis seeks to answer. 
Unilateralist policies can rarely be described to promote international peace and 
security. Furthermore they do not enhance interstate relationships, as that type of 
behavior is often short-sighted, ad hoc natured, and concerned with material 
consequences, not contributing to the needs of the society and to the states in their 
mutual relationships (Christol 2004, 13; Malone and Khong 2003, 425). Ernst Haas 
declares that the crisis of multilateralism in the world order today has been caused by a 
systematic neglect by the US of the United Nations. Haas claims that as the US realized 
that they no longer held the absolute might in the UN relative to other actors within the 
system, the unilateralist-interventionist tradition quickly reasserted itself in the US 
government (Haas 1990, 179).
If regarded as unacceptable, why then does unilateralist behavior exist? The hypothesis 
is that in an increasingly multilateral and interconnected world the US shows signs of 
rapidly escalating unilateralism. David Malone and Yuen Foong Khong (2003) state 
three factors that contribute to the US preference of resorting to unilateral behavior: 
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“The power position of the United States; the domestic political processes and 
institutions of the United States; and US exceptionalism” (2003, 424). I agree with this 
in so far as I have already acknowledged the power position of the US in the beginning 
of the thesis, I have chosen my empirical research materials from domestic political 
field for the reason that I believe the domestic political system most heavily influences 
the US foreign policy decisions, and the exceptionalism I will address at a later point. 
Such a policy may alienate a country from its allies, in as much as to harm other aspects 
of power, for example in the economic field. This has not slowed down the United 
States. One fairly recent clash between the usage of unilateralism versus multilateralism 
occurred in the case of the Security Council debate over the validity of posing sanctions 
towards the country of Iraq on the basis of harboring weapons of mass destruction, and 
consequently on declaring war against the country. The United States finally decided to 
act on its own, without the consent of the UN, and without a resolution and support 
from the Security Council. Legitimacy was then based on former, existing SC 
resolutions, and again, the country's right to self-defense (Ryan 2006, 177-179). Lebow 
argues that ironically enough the US has manifested unilateralism in cases where many 
American scholars thought it was not in the national interest of the country, namely in 
the case of the International Criminal Court (ICC) and negotiations regarding the policy 
towards Iran (2010, 72). 
As is already evidenced here, the theoretical difference between the US and the UN is 
quite wide, and sparks completely different kind of behavior. How then are the liberal 
internationalists and the neorealists to get along? It is certain that international 
organizations overall manage to achieve fewer and smaller goals than independent 
states acting unilaterally, but could it be said that all that is achieved by multilateral 
means counts towards a more lasting and secure future for all? 
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7 SELECTION OF EMPIRICAL MATERIALS AND METHODOLOGY
”The critical ontology of ourselves has to be considered not, certainly, as a theory, a doctrine,  
nor even as a permanent body of knowledge that is accumulating; it has to be conceived as an  
attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the  
same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the  
possibility of going beyond them” (Michael Foucault 1984, 50). 
As the process of attempting to understand behavior naturally yields to subjective, 
interpretive methods instead of scientifically measurable quantitative methods, this 
thesis will be constructed through qualitative critical analysis of written materials, using 
the method of discourse analysis. In this thesis the concept of discourse is understood as 
“a specific series of representations and practices through which meanings are 
produced, identities constituted, social relations established, and political and ethical 
outcomes made more or less possible” (Campbell 2010, 226). 
The aim is not to generate new objective knowledge, but instead what follows is a 
subjective interpretation of the situation under study. The researcher's position remains 
rationalist/realist, with a necessary hint of idealizing a world as it 'ought' to be, instead 
of how it is now, with an attempt to understand actions taken by units, instead of just 
explaining acts. 
Post-structuralism will be used as an approach to study social relations11, as it 
concentrates on the relationship between power and identity in a subjective, and 
performative linguistic manner (Campbell 2010, 226-229). Viewing “politics as a 
dynamic creative activity in which actors have no choice other than, through the artful 
use of political terms and concepts, to convince themselves and others of the utility, 
truth or virtue of their perspective: a classical, agonistic, conception” (Finlayson 2004), 
the hope is to have understood something of how things have been in the recent past, 
and in light of this to be able to give one possible account of how things may shape up 
to be in the near future. 
11 And not as a theory of International Relations in itself (Campbell 2010, 216). 
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The first hand empirical materials selected for this study include the official speeches of 
the key players. Namely, I will provide a reading of the four State of the Union 
addresses12 both presidents have given to the nation. In addition to the fact that the 
performance of this speech is written in the Constitution, the State of the Union speech 
has risen to represent the most important policy blueprint of the US administration in 
power. The speech is televised nationally and quoted excessively around the globe 
afterward, and as it always occurs in January, creates images of what to expect from the 
administration in the coming year. 
The study of rhetoric in this thesis is understood as “the ways in which fundamental 
principles and ideas are formulated, expressed and then developed in argumentative 
action” (Finlayson 2004, 540). Out of the rhetoric of these speeches will rise the main 
discourses to be used in this study. Next, I will move on to read remarks by the 
Presidents' Secretaries of State, who are the de facto foreign ministers of the country. It 
remains to be seen if their remarks confirm the discourses of the Presidents. At 
appropriate moments other official texts will be reviewed, and the discourses will be 
backed up by readings of academic authors in the field.
After all the rhetoric, in chapter 9, I will look at actual foreign policy decisions made 
during both presidential terms. This includes reading the most important foreign and 
security-political publications the White House releases, the National Security 
Strategies (NSS) of both Presidential administrations, speeches and statements by the 
Ambassadors to the UN, as well as other official moves made by the Presidents. In the 
conclusion, it will be decided whether or not the foreign policy paradigm has changed 
or remained the same overall and specifically if any changes in the attitude towards the 
UN during the first Obama administration appear.
12 State of the Union Address is a yearly speech given by the President of the United States to the 
Congress: ”He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union”. 
Stated in the Constitution of the United States, Article II Section 3.
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8 PRESIDENTIAL DISCOURSES REVEALED THROUGH READING OF 
THE STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESSES
”In the American case the identity has a particular character. This nationalist identity has been  
organized historically around powerful and enduring conceptions of America's exceptional  
character and universalist mission in the world. Based on a mix of historical fact and cultural  
mythology, American nationalism is periodically aroused in the form of a crusading spirit to  
remake the world” (Daniel Wirls 2010, 12).
In this chapter I will use discourse theoretical methods to provide a close reading of the 
rhetoric of the two presidents discussed in this paper. I will begin by going through 
President Bush's second term speeches from 2005 to 2008, and formulate his main 
discourses by using concepts and terminology created by Ernesto Laclau and other 
discourse theorists. The same will then be done for president Obama's first term 
speeches from 2009 to 2012. In addition to identifying their own discourses that have 
guided policy-making and formulation, I will identify some common discourses that 
show through in the rhetoric of both presidents. This is followed by a brief analysis of 
the usage of these discourses in the presidential foreign policy-making. In order to be 
able to form a more educated analysis I will move on to read speeches and rhetoric of 
the presidents' Secretaries of State, namely Ms. Condoleezza Rice and Mrs. Hillary 
Clinton, which will either confirm or negate the initial discourses of the presidents.
8.1 Unilateral Bush and the discourse of danger
President Bush starts off his first second term speech in 2005 rather mildly and 
respectfully, by using phrases such as “great privilege” and “we must be good 
stewards”. In the beginning he addresses domestic problems and achievements, 
emphasizing positive concepts such as “liberty, compassion, and freedom for all 
Americans”. The last three pages of the speech are about the American mission abroad, 
and especially in the Middle East. Bush talks about terrorism, friends and allies, liberty, 
and freedom again. The UN is mentioned in the speech once, when Bush refers to the 
UN having helped the US with arrangement of elections in Iraq. Other countries of the 
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world (aside from Middle Eastern countries) are not mentioned. The tone is rather 
respectful to the end, and Bush attempts to make clear that the United States is not 
imposing anything on others, but merely protecting its own peace and security by 
operating abroad: “Our aim is to build and preserve a community of free and 
independent nations, with governments that answer to their citizens and reflect their 
own cultures. And because democracies respect their own people and their neighbors, 
the advance of freedom will lead to peace. “
In the 2006 speech, a dramatic change has occurred. The tone of the president is more 
direct (“we seek the end of tyranny in our world”), more aggressive (“we remain on the 
offensive against terror networks. We have killed or captured many of their leaders. And 
for the others, their day will come.”) and could be described as preaching rather than 
speaking. At some point Bush's rhetoric gets close to plain war-mongering. Bush goes 
on for the first half of the speech about the war on terror in the Middle East. At one 
point he even directly addresses his words to the citizens of Iran. This is not a speech 
about the State of the Union, but about the State of the War. Bush talks about “fighting, 
being on the offensive, striking, and killing”. The tone of not imposing anything on 
others has changed into America actively promoting democracy in the Middle East13. At 
some point Bush even says directly that the country is in the middle of a long war 
against an enemy, whoever that enemy may be.
Bush does not mention the UN once. Only two other countries aside from the Middle 
Eastern countries, China and India, are mentioned, and their economic growth is 
described as a threat and fear to the US. God and religion is mentioned multiple times. 
The last four pages are finally directed towards the citizens, but the preaching tone 
continues. This is evidenced by the fact that Bush begins all paragraphs with the same 
repeated sentence, such as: ”Keeping America competitive”...and ”A hopeful society”... 
Religion is referred to by Bush stating that the country has been called into this current 
role, and the country did nothing to invite this mission. Divine destiny is hinted at.
13 The 2006 National Security Strategy (NSS) of the United States claimed that ”it is the policy of the 
United States to seek and support democratic movements and institutions in every nation and culture, 
with the ultimate goal of ending tyranny in our world”. March 2006, 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf.
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The 2007 speech begins moderately again, with President Bush addressing the 
American citizens, and positively discussing the domestic political reality. Bush begins 
almost all paragraphs in the first three pages with the sentence: ”A future of hope and 
opportunity...” He stresses bipartisan cooperation and working together towards a better 
future for the Americans. On page four he turns towards foreign policy, again in the 
Middle East. He starts off gently, reminding Americans how the continuing war on 
terror has helped them, and how Americans can now feel safer within their own borders. 
Towards the end of page four, Bush begins to gain momentum again and shows harsher 
language. The word ”kill” is spoken three times in one sentence. When discussing the 
state of the war, Bush first seems apologizing and tired, and lowers himself to the same 
level with the citizens, stating that he would also like this war to be over.
This is, however, only staging for what is coming next. Bush continues that this war the 
country is in, is not a war that America intended, but again, was thrust upon it by some 
divine power. He announces a new strategy for the war on terror, which deploys tens of 
thousands of new troops to battle. This is a change from previous years when discussion 
about recalling of troops has prevailed. Bush backs up his decision by stating that this 
war is not similar to conventional wars fought by the country before, which have lasted 
a few years and had a decisive beginning and an end, but instead, this is a generational 
war that will continue long after the current leaders are gone. Bush then continues by 
asking the Congress to increase the size of the active Army and Marine Corps by 92,000 
in the next 5 years, as well as to design and establish a volunteer civilian reserve corps. 
These are, naturally, huge investments for the country.
After these statements Bush realizes he has been asking for a lot, and begins to soften 
the ground by changing the subject. For the first time ever in his speeches from 2005 he 
mentions the United Nations more than in passing, the NATO (North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization), and other countries around the world with whom the US is working 
together. For the first time in his speeches the words diplomacy and foreign policy are 
spoken. Bush mentions other international objectives other than Middle East policy. The 
tone of the speech is still towards listing entities that are helping the US reach its goals, 
rather than the US being proud of being a member of any international grouping. 
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Bush ends this part of the speech by stating that America ”hears the call”, (from whom, 
is not told) to act abroad because ”to whom much is given, much is required”. This is, 
again, the divine destiny of the United States to act the way it does. The last page of the 
speech, in a new move, is dedicated to personal success stories of ordinary Americans 
who have acted heroically and with courage. This serves as a reminder to all Americans, 
that all of the country's acts are a show of strength, generosity, compassion, and 
character, qualities of which the country of the United States is made of.
The 2008 speech is Bush´s last one as the president of the country. One can feel the 
difference in this speech compared to the previous ones. Bush talks more diplomatically 
than before; “let us show our fellow Americans that we recognize our responsibilities 
and are determined to meet them. Let us show them that Republicans and Democrats 
can compete for votes and cooperate for results at the same time.” For the first time he 
discusses the global role of the country in fighting against common threats. He mentions 
an international summit that the country will host, and he discusses other international 
commitments the country is, and will be, a part of. The same rhetoric about fight against 
terror and enemies prevails. Bush states that the country will stay on the offensive, and 
will keep fighting this ideological struggle against the dangers threatening the country.
It becomes evident early on that President Bush's main discourse is danger, and closely 
related to that, a discourse of unilateralism14. Bush takes the role of a protector of the 
nation. His tone of speech is designed to instill fear on the people, and make them 
believe that if the proposed steps are not taken as directed, something very bad will 
happen to all of the citizens of the country. This fits with the historical trend in the US 
politics where the president is expected to take the role of a hero and a primary 
responsibility of policy formation during a crisis (Maidment and McGrew 1991, 70-72). 
Bush describes very carefully many of the horrific acts performed by terrorists, and 
reminds the people that the only way to defend the country is by offensive, preemptive 
military policy. This is a constructivist method of giving meaning to threats, identity, 
14 One should acknowledge that not all Republicans in the US presidential history can be called 
unilateralists, and neither can all Democrats be seen as firm believers in multilateralism (Malone 
2003, 28). 
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and human suffering in claiming legitimacy for the reasons leaders give for their actions 
(Fierke 2010, 192). Bush's rhetoric implies that his goal is not to be a friend with whom 
one is able to negotiate, but instead an authoritative figure whose political choices must 
be seen as inevitable, inescapable, and crucial for the survival of the nation, and they are 
not to be questioned. 
To put President Bush's speeches in perspective, it should be remembered that in 2005 
the country was already at a state of war. During Bush's first term the nation suffered the 
terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001, and this served as a catachrestic moment for the 
president (Buckley and Singh 2006, 14). He was in a position to act, in fact, it was 
required that he act at the moment of crisis, and out of the variety of choices he had at 
his disposal, he chose to create the Bush Doctrine15; he begun the Global War on Terror 
(GWOT) (Wirls 2010, 2-3). In fact President Bush created something that had not 
existed before, and that gave him freedom to act in ways that would not have been 
tolerated prior to 9/11. 
According to post-structural analysis the movement from one paradigm to another at a 
time of crisis must involve a political judgment by the actors by which to understand the 
crisis and formulate responses (Finlayson 2004, 534). That catachrestical move carried 
President Bush on to his second term, and much of his energy during that term was 
invested in keeping that momentum going. Emilia Palonen describes this type of usage 
of catachresis as Laclauian, where one names the not before named, or gives a name to 
some new phenomena (2010, 7). Daniel Wirls describes the GWOT as an ”ideological, 
political and fiscal equivalent” of another Cold War (2010, 3). This was a war to be 
fought against terrorism anywhere, and against anyone if needed, much in the same way 
as had been done when fighting against communism during the Cold War, and this was 
largely a result of how the Bush administration interpreted the 9/11 attacks to the public 
(ibid., 128).
15 Even though President Bush and the main figures in his administration have never publicly referred to 
the Bush Doctrine, the so-called new foreign policy doctrine after the 9/11 attacks, formulated by the 
presidency and released in the National Security Strategy (NSS) of September 2002, has been called 
that by public leaders and academic authors worldwide. The NSS describes the four pillars of the 
doctrine as: ”The maintenance of American military primacy; the embrace of preventive war as a 
supplement to traditional deterrence; the war on terrorism; and democratization”. (Buckley and Singh 
2006, 3-4). 
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According to Malone, Bush's bold rhetoric from his first term indicated a policy of 
“assertive unilateralism” or “multilateralism à la carte” (2003, 31), and that seemed to 
continue during his second term.  Bush's rhetoric can be called bold also in a sense that 
he is able to assure those who promote his policies, and completely anger those who are 
opposed to his policies. It has to be acknowledged also, that President Bush was serving 
his second term, and was not going to be running for president anymore. This may very 
well have influenced his rhetoric as he was freed from the constrains of collecting votes 
to keep his job. Still, it is my view that Bush's rhetoric was bolder and more aggressive 
at the beginning of his term, when he was still (theoretically) in danger of facing 
impeachment mid-term, and his last speech was the most diplomatic ever even though 
he was leaving the post at that time. 
During Bush's second term, which this study analyzes, the Global War on Terror served 
as the empty signifier, under which umbrella the president was able to sweep any and all 
of his policy decisions. There was not one soul who would resist or protest, since the 
GWOT was inevitable, and it protected the nation from all evils. Wirls claims that the 
public slowly learned that the GWOT was not so much about Osama bin Laden, Al 
Qaeda, Afghanistan, or even Iraq, as it was about unprecedented military buildup, global 
superiority and domination (2010, 168). This is a clear example of a Laclauian usage of 
an empty signifier, described as a signifier without a signified (Laclau 1996). The 
signifier in itself is not empty, but in the process of gaining significance and in creating 
unity among various groups within the society, the signifier overflows with meaning 
and thus is emptied out of the original purpose (Palonen 2008). 
Bush uses many terms as floating signifiers: Hope, because there has to be light at the 
end of the tunnel that is shown to the people from time to time; religion, because there 
is no other way than God's way of showing what the country should do at any moment; 
and opportunity, which is needed to defend the nation's policies, because an opportunity 
of an offensive strike will create opportunities of freedom, safety, power, and strength. A 
floating signifier is described by Palonen as a nodal point of which there appears to be a 
struggle, or competition, for dominance (2008). 
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8.2 Multilateral Obama and the discourse of responsible leadership
I will now move on to the analysis of the next administration. In 2009 Barack Obama is 
new in office and holds his first State of the Union speech. He is firm (“the impact of 
this recession is real, and it is everywhere”) , enthusiastic (“we will rebuild, we will 
recover, and the United States of America will emerge stronger than before”), and 
aggressive (“the weight of this crisis will not determine the destiny of this Nation”) to 
get started with new programs at home. Out of the eight pages of speech, he speaks of 
domestic issues, and mainly economy, for seven pages. He looks back and places some 
blame on the previous decisions made (“this administration is moving swiftly and 
aggressively to break this destructive cycle”), but he does not name names and he is 
diplomatic enough not to stir criticism. One always inherits the previous president's 
legacy, and work has to begin from that platform. Obama's style is firm and he often 
repeats a sentence at the end of a paragraph to leave a stronger impact.
Obama's only remarks about international affairs and foreign policy concern the war in 
Iraq, and he states how he will end the war swiftly; “I'm now carefully reviewing our 
policies in both wars, and I will soon announce a way forward in Iraq that leaves Iraq to 
its people and responsibly ends this war”. He mentions how the country will work 
together with the G-20 group to work on global economy. The G-20 is a new term that 
President Bush never used. Obama does not mention the UN once. He does introduce 
another new term, “extremism”, which he often uses instead of terrorism, but other than 
that, his rhetoric about foreign policy is very similar to Bush's before, talking about 
friends and allies. His words are maybe a bit more diplomatic, and he states that the US 
has a responsibility to lead, explaining how this burden, and privilege, has been trusted 
upon the nation, and how the whole world expects the US to lead the world to a better 
future. He also mentions, briefly in passing, that his budget will increase military 
spending in the coming year.
In 2010 Obama continues with the same lines. From now on the speeches are a record 
length of ten pages, and again this one contains only one page of foreign policy. Obama 
discusses, similar to the year before, the important term of deficit of trust that has to be 
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restored in the government and within the nation, and he attempts to appeal to bipartisan 
politics in this time of difficulties. Obama is firm about America's leadership, and he is 
rather aggressive about the country remaining on top of the game internationally: “I do 
not accept second place for the United States of America”. He mentions other countries, 
and states that there is no reason they should get ahead of the United States globally. In 
that one page of foreign policy, the UN is not mentioned. Obama repeats last year’s 
pledge for the war to be ending soon, and the country working with friends and allies 
and the G-20 group in the future.
As he attempts to rid the image of America at war in Iraq from the minds of the citizens, 
Obama mentions that national security spending will not be cut or affected in the near 
future, even though many other programs will. Also, Obama admits that the one uniting 
factor across partisan politics as well as among the nation's citizens throughout the 
decades has been security. As the momentum on the war in Iraq is waning, he proceeds 
to introduce to the surface a new threat, or danger, from abroad, namely the nuclear 
arms proliferation. He promises that America will lead in the fight against nuclear 
weapons at the hands of terrorists, because it is America's destiny to lead all people to 
freedom. His rhetoric remains similar to the year before, and now he sometimes repeats 
sentences three times at the end of paragraphs.
The overwhelming theme of the 2011 speech is winning the future! Obama takes the 
role of an innovator, a great motivator, and uses inspiring words to awaken the nation: 
“We need to out-innovate, out-educate, and out-build the rest of the world. We have to 
make America the best place on Earth to do business.” It is not specified at any point 
what competition the country is currently in, however, the race must be won by 
America, because America is the greatest nation on Earth, and nobody would like to live 
anywhere else in the world. Of course he only compares his great nation to the 
dictatorial regimes of the Middle East and not to other democratic Western countries for 
example. 
Out of ten pages again, only one page touches upon foreign policy. UN is not 
mentioned, NATO is mentioned once. Obama keeps the tone light and positive, and 
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again confirms that the war in Iraq is ending, and now even defense spending will be cut 
in the next budget. He continuously repeats that America has restored its leadership role 
globally, without showing any concrete examples of that, and by hard work and 
endurance of the American people, ”the future is ours to be won”.
The 2012 speech is the last of Obama's first administration. Its overwhelming theme is 
teamwork at home, and America standing together as one nation. By uniting its forces 
the country will remain the greatest, indispensable, country on Earth. Obama starts 
impressively by announcing that the last of the troops have come home from Iraq, and 
that the war is over. He then moves on to innovate the citizens regarding domestic issues 
for eight pages, and comes back to foreign affairs on page nine for the length of one 
page total. He discusses Middle Eastern politics and states that the war on Afghanistan 
is also drawing to an end and some troops have already returned. With these victories, 
Obama continues the same old rhetoric of stating that the country has gained a position 
of strength and power, and is ready to fight new enemies with new energy. He also says 
that he is committed to keeping the American military the greatest in the world, and that 
the freedom of American people can only be maintained through the service of the 
superior troops.
Obama touches upon the matter of diplomacy once, when stating that with American 
leadership and diplomacy, the world now stands united against the threat of Iran. He 
also mentions that a peaceful end for the conflict with Iran is still possible and hopeful. 
The UN or other international entities are not mentioned. Without pausing to give 
examples, Obama preaches that ”the renewal of American leadership can be felt across 
the globe”, and let no-one tell you otherwise. He mentions another new emerging 
danger (aside from Iran) that he is prepared to fight against, and that is cyber threats.
Obama continues to discuss the deficit of trust within the country, and this time he goes 
much further, stating that ”Washington is broken”. He stresses bipartisan cooperation, 
and even admits that the executive branch is in need of reform. The message is that only 
with cooperation and playing as one team, can the country fix itself, and will remain 
strong in the international arena as well. Overall, Obama's tone of his speech is more 
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peer-like compared to Bush's authoritarian tone. Obama includes many more individual 
survival and success stories than Bush ever did, and places himself at the same level 
with an ordinary citizen more naturally than President Bush did. Compared to Bush, 
Obama's rhetoric cannot be called bold in the same sense. Because he talks at length in 
fluent language, there remains, at the end, certain vagueness and one may not say with 
confidence what his position towards different issue areas is. In other words, Obama's 
style is more diplomatic. 
What is interesting to note, is that every year President Bush talked about finding new 
energy sources and becoming less dependent on foreign oil imports. In President 
Obama's first speech in 2009 he says that the country imports more oil now than ever 
before. Every year Bush talked about cutting the deficit and creating a surplus. In 2009 
Obama says the country inherited a trillion-dollar deficit, a financial crisis, and a costly 
recession. For four years in a row Bush praised his education acts, and then Obama 
comes in and states that: ”We have one of the highest high school dropout rates of any 
industrialized nation, and half of the students who begin college never finish. This is a 
prescription for economic decline, because we know the countries that out-teach us 
today will outcompete us tomorrow. ” This shows that words may say something, but 
action does not necessarily follow.
My reading of Obama's speeches raises a discourse of responsible leadership, closely 
related to multilateral discourse. One gets the feeling that President Bush may have 
been slacking off in some of his work, and now it is Obama's time to step in and take 
charge. He shows leadership, but it is responsible leadership and covers all areas of 
society domestically and abroad. His tone is positive, innovative, and he shows firmness 
and promises a better future for the Americans if following his leadership. It has to be 
kept in mind that a new president always inherits the work of the previous president, 
and substantial elements of prevailing doctrines and policies are likely to remain in 
place for a period of time (Buckley and Singh 2006, 13). 
Here one can apply Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe's later work, in which they 
distinguish between antagonism and dislocation when discussing identity and the ”us” 
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versus ”the others” layout. With his more positive tone and open-minded outlook, 
Obama's rhetoric creates an open space to think about the others as not merely enemies, 
but as adversaries, who have the right to exist alongside us and have to be tolerated 
(Mouffe 2005,4). Mouffe argues, moreover, that; ”modern democracy's specificity lies 
in the recognition and legitimation of conflict, and in the refusal to suppress it by 
imposing an authoritarian order” (Norval 2000, 230). Even though Bush claimed to be 
acting in the name of democracy in his foreign policy decisions, it is exactly the 
imposition of an authority when one country enters another one and changes the regime 
by force (Fierke 2010, 193).
To put Obama's speeches in perspective, at the moment he took office, the country had 
been fighting a long and costly war for years, and the nation was in a bad economic 
recession. It is thus quite natural that he discusses the state of the domestic politics 
much more than he does international politics. Therefore, Obama's empty signifier is 
change. This is a concept he created already during his presidential election campaign, 
and now he has been able to put it in practice. One can take almost any policy, decision, 
or opinion of President Bush and President Obama is ready to change it into something 
completely different. As floating signifiers Obama uses different issue areas where he is 
to show leadership and change. These include economic revival, scientific and 
technological innovation, responsible use of power, defensive use of military force, etc. 
These issue areas can be raised to the top of the agenda on a rotating basis depending on 
the state of the nation, and of the world.
Obama's rhetoric can be described as Skinnerian paradiastole, which Palonen describes 
as ”a redescriptive political change, achieved by changing the normative content of a 
concept” (2010,7). Obama is not attempting to create anything new, but instead he is 
collecting the ashes from previous fires burned, and remaking something out of the 
existing conditions. This Skinnerian technique involves replacing an existing term with 
a new description with which one seeks to persuade his audience to accept a new 
attitude, and in this case, a policy, towards the action at hand (Palonen 2010, 16). This is 
evident in Obama's rhetoric where he is purposefully articulating new words when 
speaking about the same issues, such as 'extremists' instead of 'terrorists' used by Bush, 
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and by this he is attempting to appeal to the audience to place new moral values on 
existing concepts and policies.
Compared to the Laclauian way of articulating fixity in politics, used by President Bush, 
Skinner argues for the possibility to escape fixity when articulating politics, as is 
evident in Obama's rhetoric. According to Skinner one should be aware of looking at 
things only in one hegemonic way, and instead be equipped with a broader sense of 
possibility, in looking back at the commitments inherited and in planning the course 
ahead for the future (Palonen 2010, 12). President Obama can be seen as acting in this 
manner, at least in his rhetoric. 
The mere fact that President Obama does not use the term Global War on Terror, can be 
seen as signaling a significant change in his attitude towards international law. The term 
war is an internationally used rule bound concept that involves certain normative 
behavior, whereas terrorism has been associated with non-state actors outside of the area 
of justice. By combining these two terms together President Bush was able to reason 
acts that would not have been considered acceptable otherwise. (Fierke 2010, 191.) 
Another interpretation could be that by not using the term GWOT, President Obama 
merely wants to distinguish himself from President Bush, even though he may feel the 
same way as Bush did towards international law. This can be determined only after 
reviewing Obama's concrete political moves, but is nonetheless an indication of the 
power the speaker has when attempting to put certain images to the minds of the 
listeners. 
This process seems natural when considering the political culture in the United States, 
where the presidents come from the opposing political parties. What one president has 
spent four to eight years to implement only has to come to its dissolution as soon as a 
new president steps in, if he happens to represent the other half of the population and 
sees other practices to better serve the nation. Whether or not this is the most productive 
way to practice politics in a nation-state is questionable. It has been acknowledged by 
academics that the American system of Separation of Powers may be ill-suited for 
conducting foreign affairs (Maidment and McGrew 1991, 141). Obama may be seen as 
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practicing politics in Mouffean way as well, where the process is always more 
important, the means to getting somewhere are more important than the goals, since no 
goal is ever complete and definite in politics that is ever-changing (Palonen 2008, 228). 
8.3 Security as a myth: from deterrence to dissuasion
Next comes the task of identifying some common elements in both of the presidents' 
speeches. Myths in discourse theory can be described as extremely important nodal 
points, with more than normal amount of connections. A myth maintains the structure of 
the community, and it is something everyone refers to when discussing the elements that 
glue the discourse together. A myth may transform into an imaginary, meaning that its 
importance is hardly ever contested and it is taken for granted when discussing its role 
within a discursive horizon (Norval 2000, 226). Both Presidents Bush and Obama in 
their speeches refer continuously to the same myth of security as the most important 
element of national unity. 
Every decision made is to increase security of the country and its citizens. Both 
presidents seem to agree on this. For someone having been as against the GWOT since 
the beginning as president Obama was, it is still quite unsettling how Obama never 
rallied for, nor publicly declared, to gap the military spending of the nation (Wirls 2010, 
192). This shows that even though Obama was ready to end the active wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan, he remained firm, like President Bush, that the country should keep its 
focus on security issues.
Here I am claiming that even though it is natural for all independent states to care for 
their security, and hold that concept as one of the most important ones in domestic and 
foreign policies, the case of the US can still be described as somewhat different. It is 
clear that the United States today places a strong importance on the definition of 
security and hard power, holding an absolute majority of military power in the world. At 
the same time, in a stark contrast, many international entities have begun to place more 
and more importance on the definition and values of soft power. According to 
academics there is no question that the US will keep concentrating on security and 
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military politics even if it comes with a very high political cost (Wallerstein 1995, 200), 
and there is no reason to believe that the American military primacy will face any 
serious challenges in the near future (Singh 2006, 25). 
As I mentioned in my reading of the official statements, the constant articulation of 
danger was present in all speeches, but in slightly different manners. The way in which 
president Bush described danger was to directly persuade the audience to comply with 
his policies. President Obama also mentioned many kinds of dangers, some of them, 
such as the cyber threats, even if as in passing, without really pausing and explaining 
the depth of that danger to the audience. This raises a question of how imminent and 
valid that threat actually is, and why was it mentioned at all? Campbell claims that 
keeping danger continuously alive in foreign policy articulation can be viewed as ”not a 
threat to a state's identity or existence”, but instead, it is ”its condition of possibility” 
(1992, 13). This implies that keeping danger alive actually strengthens the identity and 
national unity of the state, regardless of the real status of the threat.
The concept of dissuasion, an official policy launched during president Bush's first term, 
and continuing into his second term, is a clear and concrete example of the way in 
which the US government at the time perceived itself, and also a show of how the US 
wanted others to view it. The Quadrennial Defense Review released in September 2001 
introduced four key goals of the country's defense strategy: ”Assuring allies and friends; 
dissuading future military competition; deterring threats and coercion against U.S. 
interests; and if deterrence fails, decisively defeating any adversary” (Wirls 2010, 101). 
As Wirls interprets this report, the other three goals cannot be viewed as new or radical 
ideas, however, the concept of dissuasion was new and a rather bold move from the 
government.
The policy of dissuasion means taking a step further from traditional deterrence. It aims 
at no adversary attempting to ever even consider competing with the United States in 
military build-up. According to Wirls ”this doctrine transcended what was always the 
general idea that the United States would try to maintain some degree of superiority” 
(2010, 104). In Wirls' opinion the policy of dissuasion was quite irrelevant as the 
50
country was, in 2001, already so far ahead of other countries in military capabilities. 
Through the reading of president Obama's speeches, one can see that the concept of 
dissuasion has been transformed into ”leading by example” during his administration16.
While it seems somewhat natural that the standing global hegemon has the strongest 
military capabilities, there are many different ways in which that power may be put to 
use. A question that has recently concerned authors and media has to do with ethics. If 
one country has the means, can it use those means to achieve whatever ends? Is it 
ethically correct to build up its military capabilities while at the same time restricting 
the rights of others to do so, referring for example to the nuclear capabilities of states. 
This ethical dimension missing from the conceptualization of hegemony by Laclau and 
Mouffe should be brought into the discussion of political leadership (Norval 2000, 231). 
8.4 The frontier of freedom and liberty
Continuing with the rhetorical similarities, both presidents identify the same limits for 
their discourses, namely, us versus them, also often referred to by the presidents by 
using the terms friends versus enemies. Nobody and no entity can belong to any other 
category than these two. You are either with us, or against us (Singh 2006, 17; Fierke 
2010, 187). The presidents refer to terrorists, as well as people following other 
ideologies, as the 'others' in this study. According to Laclau, limits combine elements 
but they require that something that is not included exists. And when that something that 
is not included, is named, a frontier appears (Palonen 2008, 217). Politics only occur at 
the frontier created by these limits.
The creation of political frontiers is a common practice in discourse theory, stemming 
from Laclau and Mouffe. They argue that it is common that in the presence of a frontier, 
an enemy is constructed (Norval 2000). The 'us' has to be protected by all means from 
'them' coming from the outside. All this transforms into an overbearing imaginary 
shared by both of the presidents and present in all discourses discussed here, namely, 
16 From Bush's ”dissuating, deterring, and defeating” to Obama's ”disrupt, dismantle, and defeat” 
(National Security Strategy 2010) accessed via 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
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freedom and liberty of all people. Obama articulates this by: “America must always 
stand on the side of freedom” (2010), and “our freedom endures because of the men and 
women in uniform who defend it” (2012). This sentence also strengthens the link 
between security and freedom, as does the following by Bush: “We will pass along to 
our children all the freedoms we enjoy, and chief among them is freedom from fear” 
(2005). Even though frontiers appear paratactic in nature, it does not imply that they are 
permanent and unchangeable. Imaginaries should be considered as a result of a process 
at work in a society. In any given society there may be multiple imaginaries at work, 
and they may also be challenged rather easily (Norval 2000, 226). 
8.5 If you are American, you are exceptional!
In addition to the individual discourses identified above, as well as the common 
overarching elements present in all discourses, there is one powerful discourse that 
applies to both administrations. That is the discourse on American exceptionalism. Both 
of these presidents share the view of their nation being somehow, and for some reason, 
unique and special, and above everyone else. There is no doubt that both 
administrations, with using different methods in getting there, maybe, aim towards the 
same goal, which is to remain as the sole superpower, a unipolar hegemon of the world, 
and to be able to shape the international arena as they see fit. This exceptionalist theory 
is widely acknowledged by academics in the field (Malone and Khong 2003), and even 
though it was expected to rise in the presidential speech, I was surprised how strongly it 
was articulated by both of the Presidents. 
The exceptionalist nature of the nation is articulated in the speeches by stating that the 
real power and strength behind the nation does not ultimately lie in its material or 
diplomatic capabilities, but within the inherent spirit and determination, passion and 
courage of the people. Bush begins by stating that: “To whom much is given, much is 
required. We hear the call to take on the challenges” (2007) and: “The secret of our 
strength, the miracle of America is that our greatness lies not in our Government, but in 
the spirit and determination of our people” (2008). Obama continues: “There is no force 
in the world more powerful than the example of America” (2009) and: “America 
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remains the one indispensable nation in world affairs, and as long as I'm President, I 
intend to keep it that way” (2012). Another way of approaching the exceptionalist nature 
of the country, which both Presidents do, is to speak about the mission, and task handed 
to the nation, and its destiny to do what is ultimately the right thing. 
In post-structuralist discourse analysis the ontological starting point is ”a 
conceptualization of policy as always dependent upon the articulation of identity, while 
identity is simultaneously produced and reproduced through the formulation and 
legitimation of policy” (Hansen 2006, 211). This implies that if policies change, some 
change should have occurred in the formation of identity as well. But if the claim here is 
that the identity has remained the same during the two presidential terms, does that then 
imply that no real change has occurred in the policy-making? This is to be determined 
in this study. The discourse of exceptionalism in this study fulfills a critical component 
of post-structural analysis, that of which may be called critical historical analysis, or 
genealogy, and which is used as a tool to interpret the present by looking at the culture 
and history of the relevant actors (Hansen 2006, 212). 
Campbell continues by describing the current situation in the US as follows: ”Its status 
as the sovereign presence in world politics is produced by 'a discourse of primary and 
stable identity' (1992,10). This means that the stronger unity the country possesses 
domestically, the stronger the country appears to the international community. 
Moreover, Campbell claims that: ”The identity of a 'people' is the basis for the 
legitimacy of the state and its subsequent practices” (1992,11). This can be interpreted 
in a way that the greatest threat to the US hegemony will, after all, come from within, 
and the future of the country will depend on the way in which Americans view 
themselves in relation to other people (Singh 2006, 28). Comparing Campbell's analysis 
of the US to the EU countries, for example, shows that freeing oneself from the constant 
articulation of danger changes one's attitude towards nationalism, and leaves room to 
identify oneself in multiple ways.
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8.6 Analysis of the usage of presidential discourses in foreign policy-making
What then, do these discourses mean in terms of changes and continuity in the United 
States foreign policy? Does the fact that President Bush spent more time discussing 
foreign affairs, and that he mentioned the United Nations more often than his follower, 
mean that he cares more about foreign relations than does president Obama? Not 
necessarily. During the second Bush term, the nation was at war in several locations 
around the globe, so it is only natural that he spent time discussing that issue. He also 
had been criticized during his first term of his ambivalent policy towards the UN and 
other international organizations (Buckley and Singh 2006, 15; Patrick 2010), and thus 
during his second term speeches he may have been aiming to correct that image and 
made sure to include them in his speeches.
Moreover, does the fact that president Obama spent a considerable amount less time 
discussing foreign policy and international relations as did his predecessor, and the fact 
that he does not mention the United Nations once during his speeches spread over a 
four-year period, mean that he does not care about that organization or the relations with 
other countries? Not necessarily. However, I was truly surprised by the dominance of 
domestic political issues in President Obama's speeches. It has to be kept in mind that 
during the Obama administration the nation was struggling in the midst of an economic 
recession and thus it is only natural that he concentrates on domestic issues. He may 
also have understood that people at home were tired of hearing about the war, and made 
a rhetorical move not to talk about it more than absolutely necessary. 
If he does not mention international organizations, he does not disqualify them either, 
and Obama does mention a few global areas in which he has shown responsible, 
multilateral leadership. These are the diplomatic negotiations regarding the situation 
with Iran, as well as working together with the G-20 group, for example. One 
interpretation may also be that since Obama considers the relationship between the 
United States and the United Nations as being solid and on safe turf, he does not see the 
need to touch that issue now when other problems appear more pressing.
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Is it possible to identify some concrete policy changes directly by reading the State of 
the Union addresses? One has to look further to get more information, that much is 
certain, but something can be inferred already. We can take the fact that president 
Obama managed to end the war in Iraq and send all troops home, even though President 
Bush's policy saw no end in sight for that war he claimed would go on indefinitely, as a 
definite policy change. Another fact is that president Obama promises to cut the defense 
budget in the near future. This is the first time ever that may be happening during the 
eight years discussed in this paper, even on paper. Also the wish of president Obama's to 
handle the latest Middle Eastern crisis of Iran peacefully and multilaterally by using 
international diplomacy, shows a change in policy-making towards a more responsible 
use of power, compared to President Bush.
After the initial work of identifying the main discourses for both administrations, it is 
time to look for more evidence that would support those discourses and help draw a 
more educated and intelligent conclusion regarding change and continuity in foreign 
policy in the US. At this point, the hypothesis is that some change has indeed occurred 
with the presidential shift. However, as I identified a common discourse for both 
presidents in the previous section, I must now, in the following chapters, determine that 
which is stronger: The individual discourses of the presidents representing differences in 
their identities, ideologies, and fundamental beliefs, which reflect their foreign policy-
making, or the common discourse of American exceptionalism standing out as the 
strongest of all, representing similarities in the presidents, closing the cap on change and 
celebrating continuity in policy. This I will tackle by reading the remarks of two 
Secretaries of State, one for each President, and analyzing how their work concurs or 
differs from the presidential discourses.
8.7 Democratic Rice and the Transformational Diplomacy project
In her Nomination Hearing speech before the US Senate in January 2005, Condoleezza 
Rice states that the time for diplomacy is now. She starts off by praising President 
Bush's first term, and confirms that the decisions made have been the right ones, and 
now more work remains to be done. Rice brings in a lot of personal history and 
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discusses her qualities as a future Secretary of State. She calls for bipartisan and 
international cooperation. The overwhelming theme of her speech, however, is the 
spreading of democracy and freedom all over the world, and the fight against an 
ideological hatred.
In another speech that same year, after having served as a Secretary of State for a few 
months, Rice takes a brisker tone and resembles President Bush in her rhetoric. She gets 
immersed in the horrors of terrorists, and states that there is no backing down right now. 
She discusses transformation of whole areas of the world, freeing them off tyranny. This 
transformational rhetoric materializes one year after as Rice's Transformational 
Diplomacy project, which lays down the reorganization of the foreign service sector, 
redistributing manpower (civilian as well as military) from more stable areas (friend and 
ally countries) to more unstable and critical parts of the world, to better and more 
effectively advance the Bush doctrine (Rice 2005).
8.8 Global Clinton and the Smart Power project
In her Nomination Hearing speech in front of the US Senate some four years after, in 
January 2009, Senator Hillary Clinton is in her element. Her monologue is double the 
length of her predecessor's at the same hearing, and she transforms herself into a 
mother-figure for the entire Earth. It seems as if Clinton was the sole leader of the 
world, and the audience she is addressing, the people of the United States, was the 
government of the world, and it was their common job to save the world and lead it into 
a better future. There is no area of the globe and any threat, problem, or issue-area that 
she leaves without a mention. America will lead and tackle all of the problems that lie 
ahead.
Clinton is very convincing, thorough, and she makes many rational remarks. She 
recognizes that talking about problems such as the environmental threats, is not just 
philosophy and rhetoric, but it is a reality, and the world needs to act on it now. She 
understands that the world cannot solve the problems without the US participation, and 
the US cannot solve them acting alone either. She does remain firm in the capability of 
56
the US to take the lead and direct and persuade the others to follow. 
Her remarks lead to the formulation later on that year, after her confirmation to be the 
Secretary of State, of the Smart Power project. It states that: “Military force may 
sometimes be necessary to protect our people and our interests. But diplomacy and 
development will be equally important in creating conditions for a peaceful, stable and 
prosperous world. That is the essence of smart power – using all the tools at our 
disposal”17. In a way this gives more room to new and different ways of exercising 
power, and frees the government of the previous Bush doctrine, but on the other hand, it 
does not really provide any new ideas, tools, or techniques that have not existed before. 
It lists negotiation and persuasion as the preferential tools when dealing with others, but 
as a close second comes the usage of the military, and only as a third option are 
international organizations mentioned.
In conclusion, Rice and Clinton in their rhetoric both support unconditionally the 
discourses advanced by the presidents they serve. Rice uses danger as a means to 
persuade people to keep fighting the existing wars and to support President Bush in his 
policies. Clinton is as eager as president Obama to commit to the leadership role they 
have envisioned for their country. The Secretaries seem even more committed than the 
presidents to bipartisan political cooperation and multilateral international framework at 
least in their rhetoric. Both Secretaries also support the American exceptionalism 
discourse, Rice talking at length about the history of the nation and Clinton assuring the 
audience that no matter what others say, the moment of the American hegemony is far 
from over. This is a continuation of a historical trend of praising the exceptionalism of 
the US. Former Secretary of State Madeleine Albright stated in her 1998 speech that 
“we stand tall and we see further than other countries into the future” (Malone and 
Khong 2003, 14). 
An issue that arises here stems again from the Constitutional democracy. In contrast to 
parliamentary democracies, where the minister of foreign affairs may represent a 
17 American “Smart Power”: Diplomacy and Development are the Vanguard. Fact sheet by the Bureau of 
Public Affairs, May 4, 2009.
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different political party as the president of the country, in a presidential democracy the 
president nominates all of his Secretaries and they usually concur to the same views 
with the president, as long as they are interested in keeping their post. Here one may 
once again ponder the viability and effectiveness of this type of democracy where 
discussion and debate is practically muted and the official stance is elaborated by a 
small group of elites. 
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9 FROM RHETORIC TO ACTION
President Obama has pursued national security policies that keep the American people safe,  
while turning the page on a decade of war and restoring American leadership abroad. Since  
President Obama took office, the United States has devastated al Qaeda’s leadership. Now,  
thanks to our extraordinary servicemen and women, we have reached a pivotal moment – as we  
definitively end the war in Iraq and begin to wind down the war in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, we  
have refocused on a broader set of priorities around the globe that will allow the United States  
to be safe, strong, and prosperous in the 21st century. 18
After reviewing the presidential rhetoric, it is necessary to look into the concrete policy 
changes made by President Obama after he took office in 2009. According to post-
structural discourse analysis, policy cannot be deduced from representations directly, 
nor representations from policy. Instead, both need to be empirically uncovered and 
linked (Hansen 2006, 214). In so far as ideas can be said to have influence in practice, it 
has to be measured how effective specific ideas have been in persuading particular 
people into believing in them (Finlayson 2004, 532). In this chapter it is to be 
determined weather Obama's changes in rhetoric have translated into changes in foreign 
policy action. This chapter will concentrate heavily on foreign policy action by 
President Obama, but will also touch upon President Bush's former decisions. Even 
though it is not to be expected that everything Obama has articulated has been achieved, 
some of the promises made in the State of the Union speeches should have been realized 
in practice, if not for any other reason but the President's own approval ratings and 
credibility as the leader of the nation. 
When moving onto the concrete examples, it has to be acknowledged that other factors 
come into play, as clearly the President himself does not make all of the decisions for 
the country. Not all of the President's suggestions ever get to be realized in practice, and 
no matter how powerful a figure the president is, the whole government is involved in 
law- and policy-making in a democratic country. Here comes to play the system of the 
checks and balances by the Constitution, and brings into the picture the US Congress. 
18 Guiding principles of President Obama's Foreign Policy: http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-
policy. 
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At the end of this chapter the task is to determine which discourse plays the dominant 
role in the actions of the presidents, compared to their rhetoric. 
9.1 Changes in the United States security policy under President Obama
The Constitutional Departments of Defense and State have been challenged, since its 
creation in 1947, by the National Security Council (NSC) in influencing the President 
and policy-making, especially in the field of military and foreign policies. The 
documents released by this bureau and especially the role of the National Security 
Adviser to the President has grown more and more significant during the recent decades 
(Maidment and McGrew 1991, 79). That is why this chapter will review critical parts of 
what is called the most important policy document in the field of foreign and security 
politics for the country, the National Security Strategies (NSS), for both presidents in 
this study19. I will briefly outline the NSS 2006 by the Bush presidency, and then the 
NSS 2010 by the Obama presidency, and look for changes in policy and the usage of the 
dominant discourses. 
The NSS 2006 is a wartime strategy paper mostly concerned with ending tyranny and 
spreading freedom and liberty in the world. The paper is a direct continuation of the 
NSS 2002, (which was released shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks) listing 
successes and naming the challenges forward. It has been argued that the most radical 
part of an otherwise predictable document of NSS 2002 was the statement to act pre-
emptively if needed (Ryan 2006, 173). This is confirmed in the 2006 strategy by 
referring to the inherent right of self-defense by the US. Many pages are afforded to 
describing terrorism today, vividly teaching the reader a lesson on how the mind of a 
terrorist works and what one aims to achieve. After getting to know the enemy, the 
document states what democracy can offer the people after tyranny and terrorism has 
been defeated. 
19 The usage of these documents is justified by the fact that as one enters the web-page of the White 
House, and clicks on the Foreign Policy button under Issues, the first link to be presented is for the 
NSS. http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy. 
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The NSS 2006 continues to describe genocide, biological, nuclear and chemical 
weapons, and discuss the dictatorial strategies of Saddam Hussein's regime at length, 
even though Saddam Hussein had already been toppled at the point of publishing the 
NSS 2006, and was eliminated later on in the same year. This is a clear usage of the 
discourse of danger to draw people together. Maybe more than laying out the way 
ahead, this paper dwells on the past decisions. It affords the minimum amount of space 
possible for the UN. It may be concluded that this document follows President Bush's 
discourses on danger as well as unilateralism. 
The NSS of 2010, in a stark contrast to its predecessor, is a lesson in multilateral 
engagement, responsible moral leadership and strategies to succeed. It takes moral 
responsibility as a groundbreaker in world politics and promises to lead by example. It 
acknowledges the rocks in the road in the relationship with the UN in the past, and 
commits to strengthen the organization from within. This is no longer a strategy 
document of wartime, but a fresh start on how to move on from the past and to tackle 
new challenges. The language is more positive in tone and the strategies are directed 
towards a broad range of interests the nation has and will pursue. 
The great security-political achievements by the first Barack administration include the 
successful ending of the war in Iraq, and the elimination of al Qaeda's Osama bin 
Laden20. Even though the former achievement boosted Obama's profile considerably, 
and represents a change from Bush's policy, the latter decision has received much 
criticism as it was another show of the US unilateral military action (Aaltola and 
Salonius-Pasternak 2012, 7). The NSS 2010 makes a strong commitment to non-
proliferation globally as well as to reducing the US nuclear arsenal. The document also 
prohibits the use of torture without exceptions. 
Even though many steps have been taken towards comprehensive reform efforts by the 
Obama administration, it is clear that contradictions still remain in the rhetoric and 
concrete policies of the government. Obama has stated that power is no longer a zero-
sum game, and we live in a world of security-interdependence (Patrick 2010). But still, 
20 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy   
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“the United States must reserve the right to act unilaterally if necessary to defend our 
nation and our interests” (NSS 2010). President Obama has acknowledged that the US 
cannot solve the global problems alone. “As a practical matter, of course, the United 
States accepts “a little less sovereignty” every day, often choosing to pool some 
sovereign functions with other nations or to voluntarily accept restrictions on its policy 
autonomy in order to cope with deepening economic and security interdependence.” 
(Patrick 2010). “And yet it remains political suicide for any US aspirant to elective 
office to speak of moving “beyond sovereignty”—or indeed to speak the language of 
“global governance”—given the undercurrent of suspicion that international institutions 
are running roughshod over the US Constitution.” (Patrick 2010). 
And that this President has not done either. The strongest discourses at work here are the 
discourse of responsible leadership, multilateralism without the neglect of unilateralism 
as a viable option, and American exceptionalism. This is confirmed by the White house: 
“To advance America’s national security, the President is committed to using all 
elements of American power, including the strength of America’s values.”21
9.2 Changes in the United States foreign policy towards the United Nations
The United States Permanent Representative to the UN, Ambassador Susan Rice, 
remarks in her speech in August 2009 that the country is dramatically changing its 
approach towards the UN. She promises strong leadership in facing global challenges, 
but also stresses the need to persuade others to join in the pursuit. In that task she 
recognizes that the US must lead by example, admit its own mistakes and take 
responsibility for them, and treat others with respect. Mirroring Obama, Rice admits 
that in today's world American interests converge with the interests of others, and 
national security of one country cannot be played by a zero-sum game anymore. In 
recognizing this the US will increase other countries' willingness to cooperate with the 
US on the issues most vital to it.
21 http://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy   
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This is a clear sign that the Obama administration has changed the course in UN policy, 
from President Bush's strategy of boycotting and withdrawal, to addressing problems 
hands on, taking part and making change occur as needed. An example of this is the 
recent US re-participation in the UN Human Rights council (Jones and Gowan 2009). 
Ambassador Rice states that the Obama administration acknowledges that engagement 
may be imperfect, requires hard work, and yields slow results, but isolation would 
simply mean giving up completely. The US is now concentrating on elaborating what it 
stands for, not what it stands against. In 2009 the Obama administration cleared all of the 
arrears to the UN that had accumulated during the years of 2005-2008. The 2010 budget 
of the US also requested that the country will keep paying its UN dues on time in the 
future, and stop the historical trend of paying its dues regularly almost a year late, a 
tradition that has been followed since the 1980's. (Rice, S. 2009). 
Ambassador Joseph Torsella, the US Representative for UN Management and Reform, 
spells out the latest US policy regarding the UN reform, in a speech at the Council on 
Foreign Relations, in January 2012. The key words rising from that speech involve 
making the UN more accountable, efficient, effective, and respected. Torsella assures 
the audience that the US believes in multilateral diplomacy, and in a strong UN that is 
critical to US national security. The first priority is cutting the UN budget, and this the 
US has already achieved. The US wants to make sure it is not paying for anything that 
does not bring back results. The next task is accountability. Here the Ambassador 
regularly states that the US will lead reform by example, giving concrete examples on 
how the US government has acted domestically to provide greater accountability to the 
public. 
Torsella then moves on to admit, that the US hasn’t always practiced what it is 
preaching, and confirms that the US reform leadership at the UN and elsewhere in the 
international arena is stronger when committing to the same standards they urge on 
others. This kind of talk is acceptance, acknowledgement of own position, and indicates 
a change in attitude. This type of self-searching is the imperative first step when real 
change is wanted. However, when Torsella states that ”abusers of international law or 
norms should not be the public face of the UN”, he finds himself in a paradox. In a 
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sense he claims that the US should, and can, lead the UN, even though its reputation and 
actions during the Bush administration ”appeared increasingly to violate the rules and 
norms of international law” (Fierke 2010, 193). At the same time other states in grave 
violations of international law should be banished from the international community. 
The UN reform plan by Obama administration is concerned with making the UN more 
effective, accountable, and cost-efficient. Even though that type of reform is necessary 
and vital to the survival of the UN, and it is the first step taken by the administration, no 
word in any plan is devoted to the reform of the Security Council and especially the 
power-relations within. As Brett Schaefer (2009) states, the new policy of the US 
government has concentrated on reforming the US policy towards the UN, but not on 
the reform of the UN itself. Even though the changes on US policy in UN are working 
in the short run, for the US to be able to confirm a strong role in the UN leadership in 
the long run, a definite position on the SC reform will be necessary (Schaefer 2009). 
Jones and Gowan give the administration credit in that it has taken major steps to 
restore America’s stature at the UN, especially among developing countries, and 
launched new initiatives on human rights and peacekeeping (2009). All in all, President 
Obama's policy towards the UN can be said to have radically changed from President 
Bush's policy, where he has been recorded to make statements such that the UN may 
prove to be irrelevant to the US.22 The attitude of the US towards the UN is now more 
respectful and engaging than it was during the Bush Presidency. Thus the dominant 
discourses showcased here are responsible leadership and multilateral engagement. 
9.3 Changes in the United States global role and identity
Many academics claim that the United States has moved from Bush's neo-conservatism 
to Obama's liberal internationalism, with a touch of realism remaining, as seeing the 
world as it is instead of drawing too idealistic a picture of the future (Patrick 2010; 
Jones and Gowan 2009; Aaltola and Salonius-Pasternak 2012). Obama's administration 
22 “Statement by President Bush, UN General Assembly”, 12 September 2002. Available at 
http://www.un.org/webcast/ga/57/statements/020912usaE.htm. 
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has moved from Bush's pursuit of American primacy to “a new era of engagement” in 
promoting global and regional security, insisting on multilateralism and other global 
powers' role in assuming responsibilities alongside the US (Patrick 2010). Obama has 
also rededicated the United States to respect the international rule of law and human 
rights by shutting secret CIA prisons and pledging to close the detention facility in 
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba (Patrick 2010), thus rejecting the use of torture, in an attempt to 
address the loss of legitimacy from which the country suffered under the Bush 
administration (Fierke 2010, 193). Even though Obama remains rhetorically committed 
to the closing of the Guantanamo Bay, it still has not been closed as of today. 
President Obama has been called a successful “quiet international reformer”, managing 
the process of bringing the emerging powers into global negotiating fora (Jones and 
Gowan 2009). The commitment of the President to international cooperation has been 
even greater than foreign policy analysts have predicted (ibid.). A remarkable change 
has been noted in the personal investment of President Obama to multilateral 
negotiations, compared to President Bush, who did work with the UN during his latter 
term, but showed no passion towards the relationship (ibid.). President Obama has taken 
unprecedented acts in claiming responsibility in international meetings, and as the first 
US President ever chairing a Security Council Summit-level meeting (ibid.). President 
Obama has understood that by the mechanisms he has been using he is able to reinstate 
the central role of the US in the negotiations, but he has also gained respect and trust by 
welcoming new members to sit at the top table (ibid.). 
Even though President Obama has re-engaged the nation in many international forums, 
it could be argued that he has only so far concentrated on 'easy' decisions that do not 
shake the core of the country in any way. A true test of Obama's new direction will 
come from the position he takes regarding the SC reform, as well as the question of the 
ICC: “If President Obama chooses to submit the Rome Statute of the ICC for the 
Senate’s advice and consent, thereby accepting (in effect) the principle that an 
international body has the authority to sit in judgment of the credibility of US legal 
proceedings” (Patrick 2010). The NSS of 2010 clearly states that the US is not about to 
consider ratifying the ICC Rome Statute in the near future. Taking a stance in the above 
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issues would show a definite change in the identity politics of the country. So far no 
evidence has been found neither in Obama's rhetoric nor in his actions as a President 
towards a change in the attitude regarding the position of the country in the world order 
or a change in the identity of the nation. Thus it must be concluded that the dominant 
discourse practiced by both of the presidents when discussing the global role of the 
country, is American exceptionalism. 
66
10 CONCLUSIONS
“It’s easy to forget that, when this war began, we were united, bound together by the fresh  
memory of a horrific attack and by the determination to defend our homeland and the values we  
hold dear. I refuse to accept the notion that we cannot summon that unity again. I believe with  
every fiber of my being that we, as Americans, can still come together behind a common  
purpose, for our values are not simply words written into parchment. They are a creed that calls  
us together and that has carried us through the darkest of storms as one nation, as one people.”  
(President Barack Obama, West Point, New York, December 2, 2009)
10.1 On the question of the identity of the United States
Even though many of us living outside of the United States believe that the hegemonic 
period of that country is coming to an end sooner or later, that memo has not reached 
the shores of the US just yet. The Americans believe in their power and will hold on to 
it indefinitely. In Laclau's words ”power should not be conceived as an external relation 
taking place between two preconstituted identities, because it is power that constitutes 
the identities themselves” (Mouffe 2005, 141). This is based on one of Jacques Derrida's 
main ideas that any social objectivity is constituted through acts of power, and that there 
is no social objectivity that would be self-present to itself and not constructed as a 
difference (ibid. 141). The research conducted for this thesis shows that the people, and 
not least the leaders, of the US, believe strongly in the exceptional identity of the nation 
that differentiates it from other nations around the world. 
“The American empire will founder not on external enemies but on the moral overload 
associated with its mission, because this makes it impossible to maintain the required 
indifference to the external world” (Herfried Münkler 2007, 154). This can be 
connected to the beginning of the thesis and David Campbell's argument that the 
articulation of fear and different dangers that threaten the country is inherent in the 
identity formation of the nation of the US. “The idea of America endures. Our destiny 
remains our choice.” (Obama 2011.) Both Bush and Obama constantly refer to grave 
dangers challenging the nation, but as the sole superpower in the world, what does the 
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country really have to fear? There is no single enemy or challenger capable of throwing 
the US down from the position of an Empire, and this confirms that the type of policy-
making the presidents practice is merely a way of boosting the country's own identity 
and position. Were there no dangers in the world, the hegemon would not have any 
purpose to exist. 
Jurgen Habermas claims that “inclusion of the other means that the boundaries of the 
community are open for all, also and most especially for those who are strangers to one 
another and want to remain strangers” (2000). This is the opposite of the Campbellian 
identity formation and can be seen in practice in the EU politics. It is closely connected 
to the way a nation approaches the concept of sovereignty and varying degrees of it. A 
classical realist thinker Hans Morgenthau has acknowledged that the Europeans have 
illustrated that ”what is historically conditioned in the idea of the national interest can 
be overcome only through the promotion in concert of the national interest of a number 
of nations” (1958). This refers to the type of 'groupism' discussed in the introduction to 
the thesis. Even though the US leaders already admit in their rhetoric that the above is 
crucial, it still does not show in practical matters of the country. The US is showing no 
signs towards letting go of its sovereignty or moving towards 'groupism'. 
All analysis of political ideas expressed via rhetoric and translated into political action 
has to include “study of the institutions in which the potential makers and distributors of 
ideas operate. And it certainly requires a focus on the institutions that enable or hinder 
dissemination, or generate ideas and release them through determinate means.” 
(Finlayson 2004, 541.) Even though it is out of the limits of this thesis to include an 
extensive study of the US domestic institutions, it did include a brief analysis on the 
limits and constrains of domestic democratic practices on the formulation of foreign 
policy. In this light, a word may be said about the US citizens as participants in politics. 
American public in general appears cynical about government and politicians (Singh 
2006, 26). The American people are supportive of the UN (Ryan 2006, 184)23. However, 
23 61% of the American people viewed the UN favorably in 2011 compared to 48% in 2007. Pew Global 
Attitudes Project, Key Indicators Database. By Pew Research Center 
http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=26&country=233&response=Favorable.
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they may not be aware of what goes on in the relationship between the US and the UN. 
The US public also has a very limited view of how non-Americans view the role of the 
US in the world, as international media coverage in the country is very weak compared 
to other states (Forman 2003, ix). American people seem unaware of how the world is 
changing today. The American society thus can be called the least informed in the 
(Western) world on the inevitable impact on global changes currently under way 
(Mahbubani 2003, 139). 
Mouffe argues that also the separation of political frontiers to the camps of left and 
right, as is done in the US, is harmful for the political process, as the public feels that 
not enough institutional outlets are provided for their multiple forms of identification, 
which include religious, nationalist, and ethnic forms among many others. This creates 
disaffection towards the political parties and the political process in general, and 
discourages political participation and thus hinders the constitution of a collective 
identity (2005, 5). “A subject who can have an identity defined prior to the values and 
objectives that he/she chooses. It is, in effect, the capacity to choose, not the choices 
that he makes, that defines such a subject. He can never have ends which are 
constitutive of his identity and this denies him the possibility of participation in a 
community where it is the very definition of who he is that is in question” (Mouffe 
2005, 29). The American two-party system can be compared to many Western European 
nations' multi-party systems. This, again, opens up the range for the individual to belong 
to many specific entities instead of having to formulate his/her identity in terms of 
belonging to one camp and fiercely opposing the other camp. 
This has led to the realization that the strongest identification people have is to the faith 
and not to the state (Dunne 2010, 150). This supports the claim that the change needed 
to act globally today stems from within the people and the feelings they have towards 
others in the world. Today more than hard military power any given state possesses, 
what matters are trust, relationships, and loyalty. In his rhetoric President Obama 
expressed the need to reform the domestic political system, when he claimed that 
something is inherently broken in Washington, D.C. He brings this issue up in his 2010 
State of the Union speech, calling for elected officials to high standards of governing 
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instead of pickering about elections24. Even though it is out of the range of this thesis to 
concentrate on domestic political reform, it should be recognized that opening the 
discussion on a topic is the first step in renewal. 
I could not agree more with Didier Jacobs who says that “there will be no sustained 
global peace and security without overcoming nationalism” (2010). This does not mean 
that we will have to completely lose our national identities, but instead we do have to 
lose the attitude that some of us would be superior or exceptional in nature and in 
practice, and we do need to move “from a missionary to a normative approach to 
spreading peace and democracy” (Jacobs 2010, 117-121). Peace can only be achieved 
by peaceful means. Neither Bush nor Obama show any signs of overcoming nationalism 
or advancing national interests by peaceful means. There is still light at the end of the 
tunnel; a recent survey indicates that the US public today is less likely to regard the US 
culture as superior to others. Fewer people believe in American exceptionalism, and this 
is especially the view among younger, educated Americans, compared to people over 
fifty. About half of Americans still believe their culture is superior, compared to six-in-
ten believing so in 2002. 25
10.2 On the question of new policy by Obama
During the Bush administration the country was in decline in terms of legitimacy, in as 
much as assertive unilateralism spreads distrust and hostility towards the US by other 
global actors, and that of which makes it harder to translate power into influence as 
needed (Ryan 2006, 184). In this light it could be argued that Obama has reversed this 
24 “What frustrates the American people is a Washington where every day is Election Day. We can't 
wage a perpetual campaign where the only goal is to see who can get the most embarrassing headlines 
about the other side, a belief that if you lose, I win. Neither party should delay or obstruct every single 
bill just because they can. The confirmation of well-qualified public servants shouldn't be held hostage 
to the pet projects or grudges of a few individual Senators. Washington may think that saying anything 
about the other side, no matter how false, no matter how malicious, is just part of the game. But it's 
precisely such politics that has stopped either party from helping the American people. Worse yet, it's 
sowing further division among our citizens, further distrust in our Government. So, no, I will not give 
up on trying to change the tone of our politics. I know it's an election year. But we still need to 
govern.” 
25 “American Exceptionalism Subsides. The American-Western European Values Gap”. Survey report by 
Pew Global Attitudes Project released November 17, 2011 and updated Febuary 29, 2012 by Pew 
Research Center http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-western-european-values-gap/. 
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trend by making selective global moves towards re-gaining the trust and respect of the 
global community and thus cleaning up the reputation of the country. Some argue that 
the US reputation has suffered so much that even Obama's personal commitment will 
not be able to restore it (Patrick 2010). Global surveys show that confidence in the US 
president by other nations was very low during President Bush's last two years, 
sometimes in single digits, whereas in 2009 confidence rose sharply, sometimes hitting 
almost 100%. The level of confidence has since dropped again, remaining above 50% in 
many countries and above 30% in all26. 
Thus it could be argued that President Obama has been undertaking a challenge of face- 
saving, cleaning of a reputation, and reinstatement of a friendly approach in the 
international arena. With his policy of responsible leadership and multilateral approach, 
it is evident that it matters to President Obama, and to the US, what the world thinks of 
the superpower. “US foreign policy must be informed by a deeper appreciation of the 
way the United States is perceived abroad, arguing that unilateralism undercuts US 
national interests” (Forman 2003, ix). When Obama took office, many had high hopes 
for him. Now, towards the end of his first term, many appear disappointed in his 
achievements (Aaltola and Salonius-Pasternak 2012, 5). This is also evident when 
comparing President Obama's official approval ratings of 65% in January 2009, to his 
term-low of 42% in the fall of 201127. His approval ratings are going up again in 2012, 
but at this time they may have more to do with the presidential election campaigning 
than how people feel like he has performed during his first term. 
Even though much change and important reforms have been achieved, the Obama 
administration has not put forward a new revolutionary doctrine, philosophy, or strategy. 
Even though the world has experienced an economic crisis during the past four years, 
there has not been, during Obama's term, a catachrestic moment in history, which would 
have provided enough wind to the sails of change for Obama to surge into a heroic 
global role. The current crisis has not provided the world with an opportunity for re-
26 Pew Global Attitudes Project. Available at http://www.pewglobal.org/database/?indicator=6.
27 Obama approval index history by Rasmussen Reports 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_administration/obama_approval_ind
ex_history and by Newport and Saad 2012 http://www.gallup.com/poll/153800/Obama-Monthly-
Approval-Edges-Higher-March.aspx. 
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making the world order as it is now, as it typically is the case after a destructive war, for 
example (Patrick 2010). Since the times are quite normal, it has to be acknowledged that 
change occurs slowly. The Bush doctrine, if not as a name but in practice, will prevail 
because no comprehensive or compelling alternatives have been introduced. Only a 
return to partial multilateralism is evident. Unilateralism will prevail, but it does not 
mean isolationism, but rather an American form of internationalism that represents a 
long tradition in the history of the US (Singh 2006, 26-27). 
Even where a turn toward multilateralism is evident, it most likely occurs because of 
changing circumstances instead of a change of hearts regarding the policy (Malone and 
Khong 2003, 423). This means that sometimes it is useful for the US to act 
multilaterally, if it produces greater results, and sometimes the avenue for acting alone 
does not exist as a viable one. However, I have not been able to trace a trend towards 
accepting the concept of multilateralism as superior, lawful, or the only way to proceed 
in the foreign policy decisions by President Obama. When attempting to solve pressing 
problems and crises with speed and finality, the leaders in Washington resort to military 
solutions more often than would be advisable. This leads to Münkler's conclusion that 
democratic empires resort to military methods even more readily and more often than 
authoritarian ones (2007, 155). 
Even though it can be concluded that many of President Obama's policies comply with 
the liberal international worldview, such as his promotion of democracy, deepening of 
the linkages in the international trade arena, and re-engaging in the multilateral network 
of international organizations, many members of the global community still have 
difficulty in trusting that the hegemony is truly acting according to the Kantian 
principles of legitimacy and negotiation. The continued growth of liberal practices 
cannot be taken for granted, and leaders must continue to search for openings for 
actions that are at the same time mindful of the others and in the self-interest of the 
actor. The US still reserves the right to rely on its superior armed forces and benefits 
and temptations its dominance allows (Russett 2010, 112-113). In any case it will take 
time and effort for Obama, or any US President, to recover from the Bush Doctrine of 
global imperial geopolitics and the ideology of economic security under which guise the 
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War on Terror was raised to secure the oil of the Middle East (Rupert 2010, 172). 
It could be concluded that even though the US accepts most of the points advocated by 
globalists, including issues and tasks that require liberal internationalist collective 
efforts to solve, and which pose a serious threat to sovereignty and the position of a 
nation-state in the global order, it is still able to defend its realist position by 
departmentalizing the globalization thesis, by concluding that most of the globalization 
efforts deal with the economic domains, and much of international politics still remain 
static and hence essentially realist in nature. It is believed that the realist and neorealist 
theorists have the most to lose in the globalization debate, and thus they have been most 
persistently permissive of the extent of globalization so far (Hay 2010, 280-284). 
10.3 On the question of the US – UN relationship
The US created the UN, but then refused to follow the rules (Ryan 2006, 174). This has 
been a popular trend for the US in the history of international organizations and 
agreements. The country plays a strong role in shaping institutions and agreements 
(such as the ICC and the Kyoto Protocol), but when it at the end opts out of ratifying 
them, it crucially hinders the possibilities of these relevant regimes to achieve their 
global goals (Malone and Khong 2003, 4, 15). However, the refusal to participate also 
weakens the realization of the US to achieve its own objectives, and this is the ultimate 
paradox the country faces today. This kind of behavior also damages the reputation of 
the US, as it weakens the position of foreign governments to sell their partnership with 
the US to their own publics (ibid. 15). The inconsistent, nonconsultant, and coercive 
nature of the US partnership also makes it more difficult for allies to trust the US (ibid. 
16). 
The US administration has naturally defended its policies and has responded to criticism 
towards accusations of the country not playing by the rules of the UN. Tactics have 
included attacking the integrity of the UN organization by accusing the Security Council 
members of not having the courage and strength to stand up against the tyrant of Iraq at 
the moment of crisis. The credibility of the UN personnel has also been questioned, and 
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accusations of corruption have been brought onto the table. All this prep work allowed 
the US to claim that in acting on Iraq without a SC mandate saved the credibility of the 
UN (Ryan 2006, 179). 
In the relationship with the UN, continuation of selective engagement and a case-by-
case multilateralism still exists (Malone and Khong 2003, 422). It is to be expected that 
conflicts between the US and the UN will remain, as the US shows no signs of 
abandoning the preventive foreign policy, and the UN is showing no signs of accepting 
this kind of policy as a part of its mandate (Ryan 2006, 183). Malone concludes that 
even though it is recognized that the UN cannot work optimally without a US 
participation, the diplomatic blocking power of the US government is still not complete 
(2003, 27). A true victory of multilateralism, however, can only be achieved if the great 
powers, and especially the United States, stand behind it (Mahbubani 2003, 139). 
Research does point to the direction that the UN reform will increase (Singh 2006, 26), 
and that, hopefully, will lead to the strengthening of the most important institution of 
our time. 
As I now look back at the initial research questions and hypotheses laid down at the 
beginning of this research project, some final remarks are in order. The analysis shows 
that some change has indeed occurred in the US foreign policy rhetoric as well as in 
concrete action, as was the hypothesis. It has been shown that President Obama has 
changed the direction of the country in the foreign policy field, and even though his 
administration has faced some criticism towards the end of the term, it should be 
remembered that change occurs slowly in the bureaucratic structure, and the domestic 
political structure of the US can partly be blamed for that. All in all, the researcher's 
opinion is that President Obama is headed in the right direction, and his re-election this 
year would confirm that and provide a stable platform for Obama to proceed for the 
next four years. Obama has not only taken a new direction in foreign policy, but he has 
also revived the conversation regarding domestic political reform. 
In regards to the second research question on the relationship between the US and the 
UN, the results are mixed. Even though President Obama has revitalized the role of the 
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US within the UN system, and is taking a more multilateral approach towards 
international politics than President Bush did, the beginning hypothesis remains that it 
seems this is merely a fresh approach to achieve the same results that were wanted 
before. The US wants to lead the UN, reform it to fit the country's needs, and make sure 
it advances the nation's interests. Yet, at the same time, the administration has realized 
that while helping themselves it serves to help others on the way. However, the research 
and analysis shows no signs of the US' willingness to move towards 'groupism' or 
common identity, or to acknowledge one's position as an equal in the world order. 
As the researcher's position remains that only through the abandonment of the American 
exceptional identity and the 'us' versus the 'others' thinking can progress occur, this 
raises a question of how this may be achieved. The answer to this question requires a 
whole other thesis, however. I may still suggest here a few choices to start from. Tough 
choices have to be made, but they are not impossible to achieve, as has been proved 
elsewhere already. As Wendt agrees, the European Union is already well under way in 
taking the required steps towards a kind of a world state on a regional scale (2003, 506).
Wendt argues that the material capabilities and technological advantages of today 
undermine the ability of states to properly protect their citizens (2003, 493). This has led 
to the overpowering value dedicated to military and security matters and considerations 
of dangers and threats in the US. The states' struggle for recognition in the system of 
anarchy will thus lead to the system's own demise (ibid. 494). This has to ultimately 
resolve in the creation of universal collective security system (NATO?), requires some 
kind of a binding decision-making body (UN?), and will be composed of a global social 
agency with collective identity (ibid. 506). In this projection states could still survive as 
local autonomies and practice culture, economics, and local politics as they wish, but 
they inevitably would have to lose their sovereignty in matters of security politics, and 
let go of such elite formations as SC permanent memberships. Naturally this is only one 
suggestion on how to organize the system in the future, and even though for some it 
seems many sacrifices would have to be made to achieve it, I do not see this as a bad 
way to proceed at all. 
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11 AFTERWORD 
Numerous academics, intellectuals, and technology experts have provided us with 
multiple viable solutions and suggestions on how to work on the issue of global 
democracy and make it work better for all citizens on earth. Still, for some reason, the 
implementation is non-existent. We have the UN, and we know that the UN needs to be 
reformed now to bring the Security Council regional representation up to date, and the 
General Assembly should be reformed as elected peoples' parliamentary body. We have 
the EU, which is clearly not perfect (yet), but all participant states acknowledge that the 
benefits of membership are greater than shying away from the union completely. 
I agree with Raffaele Marchetti in that either democracy is global, or it is not democracy 
at all (2010, 105). The cornerstone on almost all reform and multilateral proposals is the 
United States of America. Yes, that is the most powerful nation within the system of 
nation-states today, but I refuse to believe that all of the other 199 nations sharing this 
system cannot get things done without the US participation. As Archibugi stated, one 
man alone cannot change the world, no matter how powerful he is (2010, 91). 
In the end, it all comes down to human nature. Creed, influence, and power politics still 
rule overwhelmingly those who sit on the highest throne. No matter how noble and 
cooperative people seem on paper, the realist human nature always arises from the 
anarchic jungle that we inhibit. Those in power wish to maintain their position by 
making multilateral institutions work for them, not the other way around. I agree with 
Wendt, and Nadia Urbinati, that removing the security dilemma completely from the 
agenda is the only way to open up the space for new kinds of multilateral cooperation. 
The global democratic goal should definitely not be reached by any means. (Urbinati 
2010, 96.) As long as we only participate globally when it helps us become stronger at 
home will not solve our global challenges today. People need to want to help others 
around them, because only when strong together, can we achieve greater things for 
everyone on a global scale. Maybe I have to be more patient and listen to Archibugi and 
David Held (2011) when they say that it is only natural that transformations and change 
of institutions take a long time. At least we are headed in the right direction. 
76
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Beigbeder, Yves (1997).  The Internal Management of United Nations Organizations; the long  
quest for reform. Macmillan Press ltd Great Britain.
Buckley, Mary; Singh, Robert eds. (2006). The Bush Doctrine and the War on Terrorism.  
Global Responses, Global Consequences. Routledge London and New York. 
Burchill, Scott; Devetak, Richard; Linklater, Andrew; Paterson, Matthew; Reus-Smith, 
Christian; and True, Jacqui (2005). Theories of International Relations 3nd edition Palgrave 
Macmillan.
Campbell, David (1992). Writing Security. United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of  
Identity. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
Campbell, David (2010, 213-237). Poststructuralism. In International Relations Theories.  
Discipline and Diversity. Second edition. Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja, and Smith, Steve eds. 
(2010). Oxford University Press. 
Cox, Robert W. (1987) Production, Power, and World Order; Social Forces in the Making of  
History. New York Columbia University Press. Volume I in the four-volume series Power and 
Production.
Christol, Carl Q. (2004) International Law and U.S. Foreign Policy. University Press of 
America.
Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; and Smith, Steve eds. (2010). International Relations Theories.  
Discipline and Diversity. Second Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Fierke, K. M. (2010, 177-194). Constructivism. In International Relations Theories. Discipline  
and Diversity. Second edition. Dunne, Tim, Kurki, Milja, and Smith, Steve eds. (2010). Oxford 
University Press. 
77
Finlayson, Alan (2004). Political Science, political ideas and rhetoric. Economy and Society 
Volume 33 Number 4 November 2004; 528-549. 
Forman, Shepard (2003, ix-x). Foreword. In Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy.  
International Perspectives. Malone, David M. and Khong, Yuen Foong, eds. (2003). Lynne 
Rienner Publishers. 
Foucault, Michael (1984). 'What is Enlightenment?' In Rabinow, P. ed. The Foucault Reader. 
Pantheon Books, New York. 
Gould, Carol C. (2009). Structuring Global Democracy: Political Communities, Universal 
Human Rights, and Transnational Representation. In Metaphilosophy, Vol.40, no.1 January 
2009: 24-41. 
Haas, Ernst B. (1990) When Knowledge is Power; Three Models of Change in International  
Organizations. University of California Press Ltd. Oxford, England.
Habermas, Jürgen (2000). The Inclusion of the Other: Studies in Political Theory. The MIT 
Press.
Hansen, Lene (2006). Security As Practice: Discourse analysis and the Bosnian war. Routledge: 
London.
Hardt, Michael; Negri, Antonio (2001). Empire. Harvard University Press.
Hay, Colin (2010, 278-296). International Relations Theory and Globalization. In Dunne, Tim; 
Kurki, Milja; and Smith, Steve eds. (2010). International Relations Theories. Discipline and  
Diversity. Second Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Howard, David; Norval, Aletta J.; and Stavrakakis, Yannis eds. (2000). Discourse Theory and  
Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Manchester University Press.
78
Kagan, Robert (2003). Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. 
Alfred A. Knopf.
Keohane, Robert ed. (1986) Neorealism and its Critics. Columbia University Press.
Keohane, Robert; Macedo, Stephen; and Moravcsik, Andrew (2009). Democracy- Enhancing 
Multilateralism. In International Organization 63, Winter 2009 pp.1-31. 
Laclau, Ernesto (1996) Emancipation(s). Verso. 
Lebow, Richard Ned (2010, 58-76). Classical Realism. In Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; and Smith, 
Steve eds. (2010). International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Second Edition. 
Oxford University Press. 
Lindroos, Kia; Soininen Suvi toim. (2008). Politiikan Nykyteoreetikkoja. Gaudeamus. Helsinki 
University Press.
Mahbubani, Kishore (2003, 139-152). The United Nations and the United States: An 
Indispensable Partnership. In Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy. International  
Perspectives. Malone, David M. and Khong, Yuen Foong, eds. (2003). Lynne Rienner 
Publishers. 
Maidment, Richard; McGrew, Anthony (1991). The American Political Process. 2nd ed. Sage 
Publications. 
Malone, David; Khong, Yuen Foong eds. (2003). Unilateralism and U.S. Foreign Policy.  
International Perspectives. Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Mearsheimer, John J. (2010, 77-94). In Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; and Smith, Steve eds. (2010). 
International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Second Edition. Oxford University 
Press. 
79
Morgenthau, H. J. (1958). Decline of Domestic Politics. University of Chicago Press. 
Mouffe, Chantal (2005). The Return of the Political. Verso. 
Murphy, John F. (2004). The United States and the Rule of Law in International Affairs. 
Cambridge University Press. 
Münkler, Herfried (2007). Empires. The Logic of World Domination from Ancient Rome to the  
United States. Translated by Patrick Camiller. Polity Press. 
Norval, Aletta J. (2000, 223-230). Trajectories of future research in discourse theory. In 
Discourse Theory and Political Analysis: Identities, Hegemonies and Social Change. Howard, 
David, Norval, Aletta J. and Stavrakakis, Yannis eds. (2000) Manchester University Press.
Nye, Joseph (2002). The paradox of American power : why the world's only superpower can't  
go it alone. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press.
Palonen, Emilia (2008, 209-232). Ernesto Laclau ja Chantal Mouffe. Diskurssiteoriaa ja 
radikaalia demokratiaa. Teoksessa Politiikan Nykyteoreetikkoja. Lindroos, Kia ja Soininen, Suvi 
toim. (2008). Gaudeamus. Helsinki University Press. 
Palonen, Emilia (2010). MANUSCRIPT BY THE AUTHOR. The Rhetoric of Skinner and  
Laclau: Critical Approaches to Politics.
Patomäki, Heikki (2002). After International Relations; Critical Realism and the  
(re)construction of world politics. Routledge London and New York.
Patomäki, Heikki (2008). The Political Economy of Global Security. War, Future Crises and  
Changes in Global Governance. Routledge. 
Reid, T.R. (2004). United States of Europe: The New Superpower and the End of American  
Supremacy. Penguin Press.
80
Rupert, Mark (2010, 157-176). Marxism and Critical Theory. In Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; and 
Smith, Steve eds. (2010). International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Second 
Edition. Oxford University Press. 
Russett, Bruce (2010, 95-115). Liberalism. In Dunne, Tim; Kurki, Milja; and Smith, Steve eds. 
(2010). International Relations Theories. Discipline and Diversity. Second Edition. Oxford 
University Press. 
Ryan, Stephen (2006, 173-188). The United Nations. In The Bush Doctrine and the War on 
Terrorism. Global Responses, Global Consequences. Buckley, Mary and Singh, Robert, eds. 
(2006). Routledge. 
Wallerstein, Immanuel (1995). After Liberalism. The New Press New York.
Waltz, Kenneth (1979). Theory of International Politics. McGraw-Hill. New York.
Wendt, Alexander (1999). Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press.
Wendt, Alexander (2003). Why a World State is Inevitable. In European Journal of  
International Relations December 2003 vol. 9 no. 4 491-542.
Wirls, Daniel (2010). Irrational Security. The Politics of Defense from Reagan to Obama. The 
Johns Hopkins University Press. 
81
INTERNET SOURCES
Aaltola, Mika ja Salonius-Pasternak, Charly (2012). Yhdysvallat tienhaarassa. 
Presidentinvaaleissa kamppaillaan kansallisesta identiteetistä, maan suunnasta ja globaalista 
roolista. FIIA Briefing paper 97, Helmikuu 2012 accessed via 
http://www.fiia.fi/fi/publication/243/yhdysvallat_tienhaarassa/ 
”American Exceptionalism Subsides. The American-Western European Values Gap”. Survey 
report by Pew Global Attitudes Project released November 17, 2011 and updated Febuary 29, 
2012 by Pew Research Center http://www.pewglobal.org/2011/11/17/the-american-
western-european-values-gap/ 
American ”Smart Power”: Diplomacy and Development are the Vanguard. Fact sheet by the 
Bureau of Public Affairs, May 4, 2009. http://www.state.gov/r/pa/scp/fs/2009/122579.htm
Archibugi, Daniele, Held, David "Cosmopolitan Democracy: Paths and Agents" Working Paper 
IRPPS-CNR n. 34, January 2011 via 
http://www.irpps.cnr.it/it/system/files/Archibugi_and_Held_Paths_and_Ways.pdf 
Archibugi, Daniele, Urbinati, Nadia, Zürn, Michael, Marchetti, Raffaele, Macdonald, Terry and 
Jacobs, Didier (2010) 'Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New Political Hope', New 
Political Science, 32: 1, 83 — 121 accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393140903492159 
Charter of the United Nations http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/index.shtml
Clinton, Hillary Rodham (2009). Nomination Hearing To Be Secretary of State. Statement 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in Washington, DC in January 13, 2009. 
Accessed via U.S. Department of State. 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/01/115196.htm
Crossette, Barbara (2000). ”Helms, in Visit to UN, Offers Harsh Message,” New York Times, 
January 21, 2000. The whole speech accessed via http://www.c4cg.org/helms.htm 
Holmes, Kim R. (2004). ”Why the United Nations Matters to U.S. Foreign Policy” Remarks in 
82
Baltimore December 6, 2004 accessed via http://www.state.gov/p/io/rls/rm/2004/39496.htm
Jacobs, Didier (2010, 116-121). From a League of Democracies to Cosmopolitan Democracy. In 
Archibugi, Daniele, Urbinati, Nadia, Zürn, Michael, Marchetti, Raffaele, Macdonald, Terry and 
Jacobs, Didier (2010) 'Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New Political Hope', New 
Political Science, 32: 1, 83 — 121 accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393140903492159 
Jones, Bruce and Gowan, Richard (2009): Mr. Obama Goes to New York. The President and the 
Restoration of Multilateral Diplomacy. A report by Managing Global Insecurity MGI accessed 
via http://www.cic.nyu.edu/mgo/docs/archive/2009/jones_obama_ny.pdf 
Marchetti, Raffaele (2010, 103-110). Fighting Transnational Exclusion: From Cosmopolitanism 
to Global Democracy. In Archibugi, Daniele, Urbinati, Nadia, Zürn, Michael, Marchetti, 
Raffaele, Macdonald, Terry and Jacobs, Didier (2010) 'Global Democracy: A Symposium on a 
New Political Hope', New Political Science, 32: 1, 83 — 121 accessed via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393140903492159 
National Security Strategy March 2006 accessed via 
www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss/2006/nss2006.pdf
National Security Strategy May 2010 accessed via 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf 
Newport Frank, and Saad, Lydia (2012). “Obama's Monthly Job Approval Edges Higher in 
March” April 9, 2012 in http://www.gallup.com/poll/153800/Obama-Monthly-Approval-
Edges-Higher-March.aspx 
Patrick, Stewart (2010). Global Governance Reform: An American View of US Leadership. 
February 2010 accessed via 
http://www.stanleyfoundation.org/publications/pab/PatrickPAB210.pdf 
Pew Research Center. Numbers, Facts and Trends Shaping Your World. 
http://pewresearch.org/ 
83
Rasmussen Reports. Obama approval index history. Accessed via 
http://www.rasmussenreports.com/public_content/politics/obama_administration/obama
_approval_index_history 
Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly United Nations Headquarters 
New York, New York on September 23, 2009 accessed via 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-
Nations-General-Assembly 
Report of the Secretary-General on the Millennium Assembly entitled ”We the Peoples: The 
Role of the United Nations in the Twenty-First Century,” March 27, 2000 accessed via 
http://www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/full.htm 
Rice, Condoleezza (2005). Opening remarks by Secretary of State-Designate. Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, Washington DC, January 18, 2005. 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/40991.pdf
Rice, Condoleezza (2005). Remarks by Secretary at Princeton University's Celebration of the 
75th Anniversary of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. Princeton 
University, New Jersey, September 30, 2005 
http://merln.ndu.edu/archivepdf/nss/state/54176.pdf
Rice, Susan E. (2009). Ambassador, U.S. Permanent Representative to the United Nations, 
Remarks at New York University's Center for Global Affairs and Center on International 
Cooperation, "A New Course in the World, a New Approach at the UN" New York, NY August 
12, 2009 accessed via http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/2009/august/127953.htm 
Schaefer, Brett (2009). President Obama at the United Nations: Sending the Wrong Message. 
September 22, 2009 accessed via http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2009/09/president-
obama-at-the-united-nations-sending-the-wrong-message 
State of the Union Addresses from 1790 to 2012 . The American Presidency Project. 
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/sou.php#axzz1nVawz0v2   
84
The Constitution of the United States www.constitutionus.com
The Quadrennial Defense Review released in September 2001. Accessed via U.S. Department 
of Defense. http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/qdr2001.pdf
Torsella, Joseph M. (2012). U.S. Ambassador for United Nations Management and Reform, 
Remarks delivered at the Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., January 20, 2012 
accessed via http://usun.state.gov/briefing/statements/182321.htm 
Urbinati, Nadia (2010, 91-97). Peace and Democracy: Which Ends Justify Which Means? In 
Archibugi, Daniele, Urbinati, Nadia, Zürn, Michael, Marchetti, Raffaele, Macdonald, Terry and 
Jacobs, Didier (2010). 'Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New Political Hope', New 
Political Science, 32: 1, 83 — 121 accessed via http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393140903492159 
Zürn, Michael (2010, 97-103). Why Cosmopolitan Principles Belong on the International 
Agenda. In Archibugi, Daniele, Urbinati, Nadia, Zürn, Michael, Marchetti, Raffaele, 
Macdonald, Terry and Jacobs, Didier (2010). 'Global Democracy: A Symposium on a New 
Political Hope', New Political Science, 32: 1, 83 — 121 accessed via 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07393140903492159 
